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This thesis examines the impact of the establishment of the Defense Health Program (DHP)
Appropriation on the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) within the Department
of Defense. A brief history of the PPBS is presented to explain why the Department of Defense
adopted the system in the early 1960's. The PPBS process is then described, with the focus on the
Programming portion from a Department of the Navy perspective. The events which led to the
creation of the DHP Appropriation are recounted, and the provisions of Program Budget Decision 742
which created the DHP are examined. The effect of the DHP on the PPBS and specifically on
preparing the Program Objectives Memoranda (POMs) for fiscal years 1994-1999 and 1996-2001 are
then discussed. Finally, problems with using the PPBS to estimate medical program costs and several
proposed reforms are addressed.
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With increasingly tight constraints on available resources
to provide for the national defense and the American public's
desire to reap a peace dividend after the collapse of the
former Soviet Union, the Department of Defense (DoD) must
accomplish its mission with greater economy and efficiency.
Among the many missions of the DoD is the medical mission,
whose function is to provide, and maintain readiness to
provide, medical services and support to the armed forces
during military operations as well as to members of the armed
forces, their dependents, and other beneficiaries entitled to
DoD health care. 1
Management of the medical mission is unique within the
DoD. First, as a support mission, it may not receive the
attention (in terms of planning and resources) given to the
more glamorous missions of DoD such as strategic or general
purpose forces. Second, it is unlike the other missions in
terms of planning and funding because it is an entitlement
program. And third, the medical program must not only compete
within the DoD for funding, it must compete against the
'U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Health Program Amended FY
1992 /FY 1993 Biennial Budget Estimates, p. 1, January 1992.
private sector to prove good stewardship of entrusted funds
and personnel.
Medical program funding in the Department of Defense
experienced an average annual growth rate in nominal dollars
of 8.2 percent from Fiscal Year (FY) 1985 to FY 1991. Although
that was below the national health care cost growth rate of
ten percent, 2 the DoD budget as a whole did not even keep pace
with inflation and grew at less than one percent in nominal
dollars over the same period. 3 Given the trend of decreasing
defense budgets and increasing health care costs, without a
program to identify and contain costs, medical-related
expenditures will continue to consume an ever increasing
portion of the DoD funding pie.
To address the problem of rising health care costs,
Program Budget Decision (PBD) 742 was issued on 14 December
1991 by the Deputy Secretary of Defense to establish the
Defense Health Program (DHP) appropriation. This PBD directed
that funding in support of the medical mission from Operations
and Maintenance (O&M) and Other Procurement (OP) accounts be
transferred from the three military departments and
consolidated under the control of the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Health Affairs (ASD(HA)). Exempted from the
2U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Health Program (DHP)
Program Objective Memorandum (POM) FY 1994-1999
,
p. 1, 1992.
3U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Department of
Defense (Comptroller) , National Defense Budget Estimates for FY
1993, p. 90, March 1992.
consolidation of resources were military personnel, funds and
resources in support of field/ numbered medical units, hospital
ships, and ship-board medical operations. 4
Under the new organization established by PBD 742, ASD(HA)
is ultimately responsible for the submission of a unified
medical budget. However, each of the military departments
(Army, Air Force, and Navy) continue to plan and assist in
programming to meet the medical missions of the DoD. The
creation of the Defense Health Program appropriation and the
resulting involvement of ASD(HA) in the Planning, Programming,
and Budgeting System (PPBS) has therefore created changes for
the three services in their PPBS processes.
The PPBS, even without the introduction of the DHP
appropriation, is itself continually evolving to meet the
needs of the DoD. For instance, the Program Objective
Memorandum (POM) for Fiscal Year (FY) 1992 was expanded to
cover two years rather than a single year, and the Five Year
Defense Plan became the Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP) to
reflect the change to a six year plan.
Given the evolution and refinement of the PPBS, there is
reason to examine the system and detail the changes in the
documents used, the key players, and the sequence of
events. The consolidation of the health budgets mandated
through PBD 74 2 provides further need for review of the PPBS
4U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Deputy Secretary of
Defense, Program Budget Decision 742, p. 1, 14 December 1991.
process so that the Department of the Navy's Medical community
can successfully plan, program, and budget for the necessary
resources required to carry out their assigned mission.
B. OBJECTIVES
Although the PPBS has been in use by DoD for over thirty
years, it is evolving, as evidenced by the recent changes to
the period of time covered by both the POM and the FYDP. The
consolidation of the services' health budgets under ASD(HA) as
directed by PBD 742 has brought about further changes in the
PPBS process. This study will document those changes, give
health care professionals an understanding of the process used
to create the POM for FY 1994-1999 (POM 94), and the problems




How has the decision to consolidate medical resources, as
set forth in PBD 742 of 14 December 1991, affected the PPBS
employed by the Department of the Navy to ensure that
sufficient resources are available to meet health care
requirements?
How are medical resource requirements derived from and
linked to the appraisals and assessments conducted during the
program planning phase?
How does the medical requirements resource sponsor
determine the Sponsor Program Proposal (SPP) in response to
Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) guidance?
Has medical spending been the subject of special review?
What were the major changes to the Future Years Defense
Plan (FYDP) for medical requirement dollars in the most recent
Program Objective Memorandum (POM)?
D. SCOPE
The scope of this research will be limited primarily to
the Programming portion of the PPBS for the Department of the
Navy, with particular emphasis on the POM process and the POM
document. Changes in the planning and budgeting portions of
the PPBS will only be discussed in the context of the effect
they have on programming, or if changes in programming lead to
changes in budgeting.
E. METHODOLOGY
Interviews were conducted with personnel from the Office
of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs
(OASD(HA)), Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Comptroller) (OASD(C) ) , Director of Naval Medicine/Surgeon
General of the Navy, and the Department of the Navy's Bureau
of Medicine. Instructions and regulations governing the PPBS
process and other literature examining the process were
reviewed and analyzed. Previous POMs and other related
documents used in the programming phase were examined.
F. CHAPTER OUTLINE
Chapter II will provide a brief history of the pre-PPBS
system (prior to Fiscal Year 1963) employed by DoD to plan for
and allocate the resources required to meet the national
security objectives of the United States and the events that
led to the implementation of PPBS in the DoD. The major
changes to the PPBS since its development for FY 19 63 to the
present will also be addressed.
Chapter III will explain the PPBS in terms of the sequence
of events and the organizations and documents involved. The
primary focus will be on the programming portion, with
emphasis on both the POM process and the POM document and why
they are a significant part of the PPBS.
Chapter IV will discuss the rationale behind the
establishment of the Defense Health Program appropriation,
with the focus on its role in first making health care costs
visible and ultimately in attempting to control those costs.
Chapter V will explain how Programming has changed to
accommodate the DHP Appropriation. It will both describe and
analyze how the system worked for the first consolidated POM
for FY 1994-1999 and how it is projected to work in creating
the POM for FY 1996-2001.
Chapter VI will provide an analysis of the problems
inherent in programming for the Defense Health Program (DHP)
appropriation. It will also discuss health-care related issues
such as the creation of a Defense Health Agency and other
factors which might affect the organization of the Military
Health Services System.
II. PPBS AND THE DEFENSE BUDGET
A. HISTORY OF THE PRE-PPB SYSTEM EMPLOYED BY DoD
The Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) was
introduced to the Department of Defense (DoD) in the early
1960's by then-Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara.
However, the PPB System was not created by the DoD.
In 1907, the first Program Memorandum was developed by the
New York Bureau of Municipal Research. 5 The Borough of
Richmond, New York City, devised a special program and budget
system for street cleaning, highways, and sewers in 1912 to
indicate what services would be provided given budgetary
constraints. "In the early 1930' s, the U.S. Department of
Agriculture established a Uniformed Project System that later
would be hailed as a forerunner to performance and program
budgeting". 6 And in 1938, the Tennessee Valley Authority
changed accounting structures to capture financial data in
terms of programs such as flood control and fertilizer. 7
In private industry, DuPont first developed management
tools of the program-budgeting type around the time of World
5Lynch, Thomas D. , Public Budgeting in America, p. 30,
Prentice-Hall, 1979.
6Lee, R.D. Jr., and Johnson, R.W. , Public Budgeting Systems,
2d ed.
,
p. 69, University Park Press, 1977.
7Jbid.
War I, and General Motors incorporated similar techniques at
least in the early 1920's. 8
In the 1940' s, the Second Hoover Commission, which was
established to report on the organization of the Executive
Branch, recommended adopting performance budgeting techniques
and organizing budgets into programs. And in the 1950' s, the
rise of operations research and systems analysis theory,
coupled with the increasing computer technology, spurred
researchers at the RAND Corporation to develop the framework
of what would later become the PPBS for the DoD. 9
As the U.S. government grew in size and complexity in the
20th century, it became more important to adequately budget
expected costs and revenues. It is therefore possible to
identify three successive stages of budgetary reform.
The first reform, starting in about 1920 to 1935,
emphasized the development of systems to control and record
expenditures.
As experience in expenditure accounting was gained, a
second reform was born which initiated performance budgeting
or budgeting based upon expected levels of production or
activities. This second stage developed during the New Deal
era and culminated in the movement for performance budgeting
nearly a decade later.
8Novick, David, Current Practice in Program Budgeting (PPBS)
19, Crane, Russak, 1973.
9Lynch , op. cit
.
, p . 30.
The third stage, the emergence of PPBS, was a product of
both new information and decision analysis technologies
applied to the earlier efforts to link planning and
budgeting. 10
B. THE CHANGING ENVIRONMENT OPENS THE DOOR FOR PPBS
The Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) has
been the primary management tool employed by the Department of
Defense (DoD) to determine appropriate force structure and
levels to meet national security threats within certain
resource limitations since the early 1960's. Given that the
United States had a Department of Defense prior to the 1960's,
the question arises "How did the federal government budget for
national defense prior to PPBS?"
Part of the answer is that, prior to the consolidation of
the services under the DoD organization, there were two
competing Departments: the Department of War and the
Department of the Navy. These two departments were wholly
separate, both for budgeting and operational purposes.
After the First World War, serious discussion started for
the first time about consolidating the two services. Although
our involvement in that war was of a short duration, it was
quite costly and drew attention to the need for economy and
10See Allen Schick, "The Road to PPB: The Stages of Budget
Reform," in Lyden, F.J., and Miller, E.G., eds. , Planning-
Programming-Budgeting , 2d ed.
,
p. 19, Markham Publishing, 1972.
10
efficiency. The birth of the airplane as a combat weapon had
a tremendous impact on the two Departments. While they both
struggled to find a mission for aircraft which would further
support their separation, many saw aircraft blurring the lines
of demarcation. 11
The two Departments were able to successfully withstand
the pressure to unify at that time, and continued to be
organized and equipped to accomplish any assigned mission
independently of each other. Conduct of joint operations
required special agreement between the Secretaries of the
Departments or orders from the President. It was not until
World War II that joint operations and planning were
established to coordinate combined land/sea/air operations. 12
In December 1945, President Truman proposed to Congress
the creation of a single Department of Defense, headed by a
Secretary of Cabinet rank, in order to unify the land, sea,
and air forces and to integrate strategic plans and unify the
military budget.
Truman's proposal came to fruition with the passage of the
National Security Act (NSA) of 1947, which created not only
the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) position, but also
established three separately organized and administered
nHitch, Charles J., Decision Making for Defense, pp. 12
13, University of California Press, 1966.
12IJbid. pp. 13-14.
11
departments (Army, Navy, and Air Force) and the Joint Chiefs
of Staff.
The first Secretary of Defense was James Forrestal. In his
first year in that position, Forrestal concluded that the
SECDEF had virtually no control over any but the most trivial
operations of the three departments. In order to be effective,
Forrestal argued that the SECDEF must be responsible "for
exercising direction, authority, and control over the
departments and agencies of the National Military
Establishment". 13
Acting on Forrestal' s and others' recommendations,
Congress amended the 1947 NSA in 1949, making the SECDEF the
principal assistant to the President on defense matters and
stripping the three departments of their executive status.
This amendment also created the Office of Assistant Secretary
of Defense (Comptroller) and provisions for uniform budget and
fiscal procedures throughout the Department of Defense. 14
But strengthening the SECDEF position and creating the
OASD(C) did not have an immediate impact on the operations of
the three services. The budgeting process, in particular,
continued much the same as it had in the past. The President
would inform the SECDEF of a budget ceiling or level of




the President's judgement, appropriate to meet the security
needs of the United States. The funding would be parceled out
using a fixed ceiling approach, whereby the departments would
receive their funding and then budget. 15
The problem with this method is that it assumes that funds
can be rationally distributed before the need for a program is
established. 16 As a result, the services remained essentially
independent entities, competing against each other for larger
shares of the funding. The emphasis was on developing and
winning approval for projects within the services which would
guarantee increased budget shares rather than on how new
projects related to the overall national security strategy.
Because the budget focus was short term (the next fiscal
year)
,
projects and weapons systems were undertaken with
little or no regard for total cost implications other than to
increase future projected budget estimates by the services. 17
The end result was that the President, Congress, and even
the Secretary of Defense had little control over what type of
national defense the appropriated funding was buying.
Additionally, the budgeting system did not address the roles
and missions of the services in a way that they could be
15Jjbid. pp. 2 3-24.
16Lee and Johnson, op. cit
. , p. 7 3
17Hitch, op. cit., pp. 24-25.
13
viewed in the aggregate to reduce or eliminate duplicate roles
or change priorities. 18
C. THE McNAMARA REVOLUTION
On November 9, I960, the day after John Kennedy was
elected President of the United States, Robert S. McNamara was
named the first non-family member to be president of the Ford
Motor Company. 19
After graduating Phi Beta Kappa from the University of
California and receiving his Master's degree from the Harvard
Business School (where he also taught) , McNamara helped
implement statistical control into the Army Air Corps during
World War Two. When Henry Ford II succeeded his father at the
helm of the Ford Motor Company in 194 6, McNamara was hired as
one of the "Whiz Kids" to help work on his Ford's management
problems. 20
In his fifteen years at Ford, McNamara swiftly rose
through the ranks. His strengths were in statistical analysis,
finance, and scientific management rather than in the more
public fields of engineering and marketing. 21
nIbid. p. 26.




How McNamara' s name was added to the talent pool for a
possible position in the Kennedy Cabinet is unclear. However,
after two personal meetings with the President-elect, McNamara
agreed to leave Ford and become the Secretary of Defense
(SECDEF)
.
As he assumed the duties of SECDEF, McNamara concluded
that the process the Pentagon was using for budget planning
and programming for annual operations and acquisition of new
weapon systems was antiquated and ineffective. The system had,
in effect, collapsed and was failing to provide useful
decision making information. Despite the fact that the
National Security Acts had given the SECDEF the power to
manage the military, no provisions had been made to give him
the necessary management support to properly execute his
duties. McNamara wrote:
From the beginning in 1961, it seemed to me that the
principal problem in efficient management of the
Department ' s resources was not the lack of management
authority .. .The problem was rather the absence of
essential management tools needed to make sound decisions
on the really crucial issues of national security. 22
The groundwork for the reorganization of the Defense
Department budget had been laid by several studies. In 1949,
the Hoover Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch
of Government had recommended that the government adopt a
-Lee and Johnson, op. cit., p. 83
15
budget based upon functions, activities, and projects - which
it designated a "performance budget". 23
In 1954, David Novick of the RAND Corporation presented a
study which proposed a method of program budgeting and
recommended that it be applied to the Department of Defense.
During his indoctrination period, McNamara attended a briefing
held by RAND, and was so impressed with the analytical
processes, procedures, detailed supporting documentation, and
presentation skills exhibited by personnel employed at Rand
that, once installed as Secretary, he immediately convinced
several key players of RAND to accept positions within the
Department of Defense.
Charles Hitch, who was one of the key players McNamara
brought from RAND to DoD as Comptroller, was tasked with
implementing this new system. Hitch recommended phasing in
PPBS over a period of several years, but McNamara decided to
speed up the implementation and formulate the budget for
fiscal year 1963 in terms of major programs and weapons
systems. 24
McNamara pushed to implement PPBS because he felt the
current management system lacked a means of viewing the
defense system as a whole. The missions of the three services
23See Virginia Held, "PPBS Comes to Washington," in Davis,




overlapped in several areas, and the rising cost of weapons
systems made it increasingly more expensive to procure
duplicate systems. Additionally, the planning horizon for
procurement of new technology was lengthening; the development
of new weapon systems took longer than ever to design, test,
and produce. Finally, the budget ceiling approach was
ineffective; funding was given to the departments prior to
determining program requirements. 25
The goal therefore was to link planning with budgeting,
which hitherto had operated independently. Not only were these
functions done by different groups (planning by the military
and budgeting by the civilian sections of DoD) , but their
focus was different. Budgeting only looked ahead to the next
budget year, while the planners were trying to build
intermediate and long-term plans. 26
At least in theory, the Defense PPB System was built upon
the Joint Strategic Objectives Plan (JSOP) , which had been
prepared annually by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) since
1955-56. The JSOP projected military forces on a multi-year
basis, normally for 5-10 years. However, the JSOP was
generally a collection of the individual service's inputs with
limited guidance from the SECDEF, and tended to identify
25Lee and Johnson, op. cit
. , p. 88,
26Ibid. p. 89.
17
requirements far in excess (on the average 25-3 5 percent
above) of the available resources. 27
Despite the apparent complexity of PPBS, the potential
benefits were obvious. Since the military planning function
and the budget function were already well established, the
role of programming was to provide a bridge between the two.
By creating program packages, military and civilian leaders
could view in the aggregate a major program such as strategic
forces. Then, for example, they could consider the cost
effectiveness of the Navy's Polaris submarines and the bombers
and missiles of the Strategic Air Command, and prioritize
resource allocations depending on the results. There was no
longer any excuse for random overlapping between the
services. 28
PPBS also tried to anticipate the long range plans and
costs for each program. Not only would this system bring more
order to the systems acquisition and planning process through
in-program comparisons, but by extending the planning and
preliminary budgeting horizons out to seven or eight years,
McNamara hoped to try to contain future unnecessary costs. In
the past, the Services had embarked on projects with minimal
costs in the first year or two and then, once the project was
into development, almost force the Congress and the Secretary
21Ibid. pp. 89-90.
8Trewhitt, op. cit., p. 86
18
of Defense to fund the increasingly costly project. This
procedure was called "inserting the thin edge of the wedge". 29
PPBS also introduced the concept of cost effectiveness to
the Department of Defense. The basic concept behind cost
effectiveness is to compare different ways of achieving a
national security objective and then to determine which
alternative provides the most for a given cost or achieves the
given objective for the least cost. This procedure is used for
all defense programs and, when put together, should generate
the most defense out of any given level of available resources
or, what is logically eguivalent, to achieve a given level of
defense at the least cost. 30
D. THE EVOLVING PPBS: 19 62 TO THE PRESENT
The basic structure of the Planning, Programming, and
Budgeting System (PPBS) developed by the Department of Defense
(DoD) continues as the framework for the planning and
execution of the defense program, though various revisions
have been made. 31 Schedules for action change time to time,
documents and agencies have changed names, and the relative
influence of major participants has also been affected by the
29Ibid.
30Hitch, op. cit., pp. 43, 52.
31Lee and Johnson, op. cit.,, p. 91
19
passage of time. However, the basic guiding principles have
remained virtually intact for the past thirty years.
The Office of the Secretary of Defense has maintained a
leadership role throughout the process. However, the roles
played by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the military services,
and defense agencies have all fluctuated. 32
A significant development early in the Kennedy
administration was the influence quickly attained by DoD
officials and civilian analysts in performing what had
historically been military functions. 33 In particular, the
Systems Analysis Office, under the leadership of Alain
Enthoven, exerted tremendous power in shaping Secretary
McNamara's decisions for resource allocation. Studies
presented by this office were relied on much more in the
decision making process than military experience and advice. 34
After McNamara left office, the Systems Analysis Office's
function shifted. Today, instead of conducting independent
studies on various systems, they review service proposals and
have the burden of proof in recommending changes to service
32White, E.T. and Hendrix, COL V.E., USAFR, Defense





programs. As a result of this shift in functions, the office
has been renamed Program Analysis and Evaluation (PA&E)
,
35
Another major change in the 1960's concerned the
introduction of fiscal constraints. During McNamara's time in
office, the budget ceilings of the pre-PPBS period were
dropped. Instead, the focus was on first determining the
reguirements and then trying to provide for them. In 1969,
Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird made military planning
"the means for fiscal guidance early in the decision making
process." 36 The rationale behind this change was that strategy
would not be limited by resource constraints. However, the
reality was that the resources reguired to support the
strategy were soon out of line with the available resources. 37
In 1977, Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) Harold Brown
attempted to increase the involvement of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff (JCS) and the military departments in the planning
process through consolidating within a single document the
guidance issued from SECDEF to the services. However, the JCS
and the military departments were still reactionary; the
process was top-down rather than bottom-up. In order to make
plans which would resemble those being prepared by the SECDEF,
35Jordan, A. A., Taylor, W.J. Jr., and Korb, L.J., American
National Security: Policy and Process, 3d ed.
,
p. 199, The
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989.
36White and Hendrix, op. cit
. , p. 16.
31Ibid.
21
the JCS was "forced to rely on literature searches of SECDEF
speeches, congressional testimony, presidential statements,
and NSC [National Security Council] and State Department
memoranda, directives, and policy statements to derive and
develop implicit national and defense policy." 38
In 1981, the Deputy Secretary of Defense was made
responsible for the management of the PPBS. The Defense
Resources Board (now the Defense Planning and Resources Board
(DPRB) ) was assigned responsibility for the planning phase.
This board was comprised of the Deputy SECDEF, the service
Secretaries, the Chairman of the JCS, and other key officials
involved with the allocation of resources. This change finally
gave the military the front-end involvement in the planning
phase to ensure that reguirements would be more in line with
expected resource levels. 39
Today, strategy in the planning process is initially
proposed by the JCS to the National Security Council, SECDEF,
and President in the National Military Strategy Document
(NMSD) . The NMSD does not contain any fiscal constraints.
However, the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) , which contains
the collective work of the President, SECDEF, the JCS, and the
services and is a follow-on document from the NMSD, does




Authority for each service and serves as the basis for the
preparation of the Program Objective Memorandum (POMs)
.
40
When PPBS was first initiated by Secretary of Defense
McNamara, standard appropriation categories, such as military
personnel, operations and maintenance, and procurement were
used for planning and budgeting. The introduction of PPBS
meant that all forces and systems would now be grouped in
terms of their principal mission or output. As a result,
although the traditional appropriation categories were and are
still used to present the budget to Congress, 41 nine new
programs were created by mission role: Strategic Retaliatory
Forces, Conventional Air and Missile Defense Forces, General
Purpose Forces, Airlift and Sealift Forces, Reserve and
National Guard Forces, Research and Development, General
Support, Military Assistance, and Civil Defense. 42
As the roles and missions of the DoD have changed, so have
the major force programs. There are now eleven: Strategic
Forces; General Purpose Forces; Intelligence and
Communications; Airlift/Sealift; Guard/Reserve Forces;
Research and Development; Central Supply and Maintenance;
Training, Medical and Other General Personnel Activities;
40U.S. Department of the Navy Program Information Center,
PPBS Training Course, pp. 32-35, March 1993.
41Jordan, Taylor, and Korb, op. cit., p. 190.
42Held, op. cit., pp. 138-139.
23
Administrative and Associated Activities; Support of Other
Nations; and Special Operations Forces. 43
The basic documents required for a PPB System have changed
their names during the past thirty years, but have performed
virtually the same job. The Program Objective Memorandum (POM)
was originally called the Program Memorandum (PM) but
contained the same type of information (purposes and
objectives, costs and effectiveness of alternatives
considered) . The Future Years or Six Years Defense Plan
(FYDP/SYDP) was originally the Multi-year Program and
Financial Plan (MYPFP) . The MYPFP, like the FYDP, was
essentially a rolling multi-year budget that, on the basis of
assorted economic and programmatic assumptions, projected for
each program category outputs, costs, and required financing
for the past year, the current year, the upcoming budget year,
and the four out-years. 44
In summary, there are guiding principles by which the PPBS
operates. However, the timing of events and milestones,
involvement and influence of various agencies, and the names
of certain boards and documents are always evolving to reflect
internally and externally imposed changes.
43U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Department of
Defense (Comptroller) , National Defense Budget Estimates for
FY 1993, p. 60, March 1992.
^Axelrod, Donald, Budgeting for Modern Government, pp.
282-283, St. Martin's Press, 1988.
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E. SUMMARY
To be most effective in meeting the national security
requirements of the United States, the combat operations of
the three services must be unified. This goal can only be
achieved if the planning of the forces and the allocation of
resources to meet those plans are also unified in some way.
There are many factors at work today which promote the need
not only for joint military operations but also a centralized
planning program. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the
Warsaw Pact, the great cost of military technology, and the
combination of an unprecedented federal deficit leading to
large defense budget reductions all speak to a need for a
rational means of providing the best military, able to respond
to any given national security threat, within the constraints
of the projected levels of funding.
The Department of Defense (DoD) faces many difficult and
unique challenges in defining the new threat environment,
developing a strategy to counter the threats, and planning and
budgeting for the force structure and levels to meet those
threats.
For the first time in nearly half a century, the Soviet
Union is no longer the dominant threat against which U.S.
forces train to fight. Instead, the force structure of the
future must be designed to respond to any number of small
regional conflicts. With fierce national debate over spending
priorities and deficit reduction plans, force levels will also
25
be considerably smaller. Given this climate of threat
uncertainty and deep budget cuts, how can DoD meet the
national security objectives of the United States while
staying within the fiscal limitations recommended by the
President and imposed by the Congress?
The Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System will be
the primary management tool used by the Department of Defense
to respond to the changing environment. Planners will
determine, primarily through the Defense Planning Guidance
(DPG) , what threats need to be met. Programmers will estimate
the forces and required resources necessary to meet those
threats. Finally, a budget process will attempt to ensure that
adequate resources are made available to meet the program
objectives.
In this way, PPBS transforms force requirements into
budget requirements and attempts to project long-range plans,
both in terms of force structure and their fiscal
implications. 45
From start to finish the PPBS process takes several years
and involves, among others, the Office of Budget and
Management (OMB) , Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)
,
Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) , and the Service Secretaries.
Field activities, although limited participants, play a role
by making inputs to their major claimants.
45Hitch, op. cit., p. 39.
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The Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System focuses on
long-range objectives as well as the resources required to
support them. It does not use the baseline method, whereby
budgets are incrementally adjusted each year for inflation or
budget cuts. Instead, PPBS provides a bridge between planning
and budgeting called programming, which is basically a
procedure for distributing available resources equitably among
the many competing or possible programs.
The ultimate goal of PPBS is to provide DoD with a
rational means of distributing scarce resources to different
alternatives identified to meet the national security
objectives of the United States. 46
Whether or not the PPBS can respond quickly enough in this
time of rapid change is uncertain. The bureaucracy may be such
that, by the time a plan reaches the budgeting phase, it is
obsolete or fundamentally changed in a way that dramatically
affects the budget.
PPBS also relies upon a substantial amount of guesswork.
Although rooted in systems analysis, where quantitative
results can be achieved to make decisions, national security
still relies on some non-quantitative analysis. For instance,
the kickoff point for programming is the DPG. Because no one
is blessed with a crystal ball, some threats may arise in the
future which were not anticipated today. The leaders of the
461bid.
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U.S., while able to analyze certain quantitative figures, must
also rely on experience, intelligence, history, and intuition
in making threat assessments.
But the PPBS does provide a framework for making the tough
decisions that lie ahead. Without the analytical foundation of
systems analysis inherent in PPBS, it would be difficult to
make sound objective choices among the alternative means of
responding to the changing threat given reduced funding. With
PPBS, the Secretary of Defense has a set of tools that allows
him to take the initiative in the planning and direction of
the entire defense effort on a unified basis. And, as it has
in the past, PPBS will continue to evolve to meet the
management needs of the DoD leaders.
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III. PPBS SEQUENCE OF EVENTS
A. OVERVIEW
The Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) is
a cyclical process comprised of three distinct but interactive
phases: planning, programming, and budgeting. The PPBS
provides a framework for Department of Defense (DoD)
leadership to make rational decisions on future programs. PPBS
also provides for a process to examine and analyze prior
decisions in response to changes in national security
priorities, the economy, and the political environment.
The three processes in the PPBS are based on objectives,
policies, priorities, and strategies derived from national
security decision directives. The Secretary of Defense
(SECDEF) provides centralized policy direction throughout the
PPBS process while delegating program execution authority and
responsibility to the DoD Components. The DoD Components, in
turn, provide advice and information as requested by the
Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) to permit the latter
to assess budget execution and accountability. Communication
and cooperation between OSD and DoD Components are vital in
providing the operational commanders-in-chief (CINCs) with the
best combination of forces, equipment and support attainable
within resource constraints.
29
This chapter will be a snapshot of the PPB System used by
the DON to create the Navy POM. It will examine the
organizations involved, the sequence of events, and the
documents prepared to support the Department of Defense's
(DoD) portion of the President's budget submission to
Congress.
Maintaining control and direction over the process can be
difficult and confusing. Timely publication of PPBS documents
is critical to the management of DoD because the three phases
operate on a near-continuous basis and often overlap each
other, although not for the same Fiscal Years (FY)
.
47
For example, in September 1992, the following processes
were taking place:
• Budget execution for the remainder of FY 1992
• Congressional debate on the budget for FY 1993
• Budget revisions for FY 1994-1995
• Program Objective Memorandum (POM) development for FY
1996-2001
Therefore, although this chapter will focus primarily on
the Programming portion of the PPBS for the Department of the
Navy (DON) , in order to fully understand the events which
occur in the Programming phase, it is necessary to have an
understanding of the Planning and Budgeting phases (the inputs
to and the outputs of Programming)
.
47U.S. Department of Defense Instruction 7045.7,
"Implementation of the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting
System (PPBS)", p. 2-3, May 23, 1984.
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The information presented is based upon the recent
experiences in completing the POM for FY 1994-1999 (referred
to as POM 94) and also incorporates subsequent changes which
have been made for the preparation of POM 96 (FY 1996-2001)
.
Examining the PPBS process used to prepare POM 94 is important
in that it produced the first POM prepared for the new Defense
Health Program (DHP) appropriation. Chapter V will deal
specifically with the PPBS process used to develop the Navy's




Planning is the first phase of the PPBS. The goals of the
planning process are to:
• Examine the world security environment
• Identify national security interests
• Define the national military strategy
• Plan the future force structure two to eight years in
advance to successfully execute the strategy within the
given resource constraints48
Figure 3-1 provides an overview of the planning phase and
how it leads to the development of the services' POMs.
48U.S. Department of the Navy Program Information Center
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1. National Security Strategy
The kickoff point for the planning process is the
President's National Security Strategy (NSS) . The President
receives information from a wide variety of sources, including
the State Department, the National Security Council (NSC) , the
Congress, and other executive agencies such as the Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Defense Intelligence Agency
(DIA) . The information, data, and intelligence gathered by
these agencies is evaluated in terms of the known capabilities
of potential adversaries, current international defense policy
objectives, and the current defense posture of the United
States. 49
After reviewing this information, the National
Security Strategy document is created. The NSS document
reviews global and regional trends; identifies national
interests; states political, economic, and defense strategies
for the 1990' s; and outlines defense strategies for nuclear




2. National Military Strategy Document
Upon receipt of the President's NSS, the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) begins to formulate the
National Military Strategy Document (NMSD) . The NMSD, formerly
49DODINST 7045.7, op. cit
. , p. 3.
50PPBS Training Course, op. cit., p. 31
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called the Joint Strategic Planning Document (JSPD) , is the
Joint Chiefs of Staff's (JCS) advice to the President, the
National Security Council (NSC) , and the Secretary of Defense
(SECDEF) on national military strategy and force planning
guidelines for the fiscally constrained force structure
required to meet national security objectives. It is a
comprehensive military appraisal of the worldwide threat to
U.S. interests, and includes recommended military objectives
and strategies to achieve national goals. The NMSD determines
the base force at the macro level (such as numbers of ships,
airwings, or divisions) and assigns these forces into four
military force packages (Strategic, Atlantic, Pacific, and
Contingency) . 51
Based upon the NMSD, each service may create their own
specific strategy and policy documents. For example, the Navy
released "From the Sea, Preparing the Naval Service for the
21st Century" in September 1992. 52
Both the President's National Security Strategy and
the CJCS's National Military Security Document are then used




520'Keefe, S., Kelso, F.B. II, and Mundy, C.E. Jr.,
"...From the Sea: Preparing the Naval Service for the 21st
Century," Department of the Navy, September 1992.
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3. Defense Planning Guidance
The Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) is a highly
influential document in the PPBS. As the final output of the
Planning phase, the DPG is the document upon which all DoD
program development is based.
The DPG is the first document in the PPBS process to
bring fiscal and resource guidance into planning. Fiscal
guidance is provided in terms of Total Obligational Authority
(TOA) for the next six years. The TOA is the total amount of
funds available for programming in a given year, regardless of
the year the funds are appropriated, obligated, or expended.
This guidance provides overall funding constraints for each
service; however, it does not dictate the programs into which
the services must allocate their funding.
The principal drafter of the DPG is the Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)). Through reviews and
comments, SECDEF, the JCS, Service Secretaries, Commanders-in-
Chiefs (CINCs) , the National Security Council, the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) , and the State Department all
provide inputs into the Defense Planning Guidance. 53
5iPPBS Training Course, op. cit., p. 3 4
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The DPG provides guidance from the Secretary of
Defense to the services on preparation of their POMs. For
example, the DPG for FY 1994-99 contained the following
information:
• Defense Policy Goals
• The Regional Defense Strategy
• Regional Goals and Challenges
• Programming for the Base Force
* Four pillars (readiness and manpower; sustainability
[including infrastructure and overhead]; force
structure; and modernization [including systems
acquisition, science and technology])
* Specific guidance for each pillar
* Navy base force (12 carrier battle groups, 11
active/2 reserve air wings)
* Direction for force structure programming by
strategic element for each service54
Annex A of the Defense Planning Guidance provides
illustrative planning scenarios for sustainment, readiness,
and other purposes. The Annex does not contain technical or
analytical information, nor does it make predictions of future
events. However, it does provide for the kinds of crises in
which the U.S. might be involved and the types of capabilities
required to respond to those crises. 55
As issues arise during the development of the DPG,
they are brought forward and discussed with members of the
54Jbid. pp. 34-35.
55IJbid. pp. 34, 36.
36
Defense Planning and Resources Board (DPRB) . The DPRB is a
high level committee that is active in all three phases of
PPBS. Its functions are as follows:
• Review proposed planning guidance
• Resolve major program and budget issues
• Advise the SECDEF on policy, planning, program, and budget
issues/proposed decisions
• Direct evaluations/reviews of high priority programs on a
regular basis
The DPRB membership includes:
• DEPSECDEF (Chairman)




• Under Secretary of Defense (Policy) (USD(P)
)
• DoD Comptroller
• Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition) (USD (A)
)
• Invited Service Chiefs, CINCs, and other DoD leadership
• Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS)
• Executive Assistant: Special Assistant to DEPSECDEF56
Once developed, the draft DPG is presented to the
SECDEF and to the CINCs of the unified commands. The CINCs are
given the opportunity to make comments on the draft DPG and
personally meet with the SECDEF and the DPRB to discuss their
views and recommendations. 57
56ljbid. p. 38.




The draft DPG is then reviewed by the Executive
Committee (EXCOM) of the DoD. The EXCOM provides the SECDEF
the opportunity to receive in confidence and with candor the
advice, opinions, and judgements of the Secretary's senior
advisors. Membership in the EXCOM consists of SECDEF,
DEPSECDEF, Service Secretaries, CJCS, Under Secretary of
Defense (Acquisition) , and the Under Secretary of Defense
(Policy) . 58
After considering the advice from the DPRB and the
EXCOM, the SECDEF makes the required changes and signs the
document. The signed DPG becomes the final product of the
planning phase and the basis for the programming phase.
C. PROGRAMMING
Programming is the portion of the PPBS which links
planning to budgeting. It converts the DPG and other plans
into time-phased and fiscally constrained programs. Each
service has developed its own procedures to support the
Programming Phase of PPBS. While the other services build
their POMs around initiatives originating with their field
commands, the Navy process is driven from the top-down. 59
However they derive their inputs, all the services ultimately
5iPPBS Training Course, op. cit .
,
p. 39.
59Center for Naval Analyses, Building the Navy Program
Objectives Memorandum: The Navy's Programming Process, p. 16,
Alexandria, VA, CIM-82, June 1990.
38
produce a Program Objective Memorandum (POM) for review and
adjustment by the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) . For the
Department of the Navy (DON) , the programming system is the
process by which decisions are made by the Chief of Naval
Operations (CNO) , Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC)
,
Secretary of the Navy (SECNAV) , and SECDEF concerning
modernization (including Research and Development) , force
levels, readiness, and sustainability for the Navy.
The DoD Programming System is designed to accomplish the
following eight objectives:
• Relate resources to defense missions and requirements
• Link planning to budgeting
• Establish programs oriented towards mission objectives
rather than service parochialism
• Provide a framework for inter-Service competition to
provide required mission forces
• Establish a rational program structure which encompasses
all defense activities
• Ensure that cost effective studies support optional force
structure or weapons systems proposals
• Evaluate programs on a continuous basis
• Establish a single channel for major decisions on defense
programs60
Programming works on a two-year cycle. It starts with the
last four years of the program developed in the previous PPBS
cycle. For example, POM 92 covered FY 1992-1997. When the
60U.S. Department of the Navy, "Program Planning and
Development Division (N801) Desk Top Guide," p. 3-1, rev. 17
February 1993.
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programming phase began for POM 94, it started with an
assessment of the programs developed for the last four years
of POM 92 (FY 1994-1997). Those four years are updated and
programs developed for the following two years to produce an
updated six year program to cover FY 1994-1999. The final POM
94, with its resulting changes (which will be discussed
later) , then becomes the starting point for the budget
:ess. 61
The Navy programming process involves several key players.
The customers are the commanders-in-chief (CINCs) and the
Major Claimants. The Major Claimant for Navy medicine is the
Bureau of Medicine (BUMED) . Major Claimants provide field
inputs to their Resource Sponsors for inclusion in the
programming process.
The Resource Sponsors are responsible for aggregating
resources which serve as inputs to Warfare and Supporting
Warfare tasks. Their resources may be required to support a
number of programs in different mission areas. Therefore, they
must be able to establish effective and balanced programs
within their fiscal guidance. For Navy medicine, the Surgeon
General of the Navy (N093) is the Resource Sponsor. His
largest claimant is BUMED, but he must also program for the
allocation of resources to other claimants reporting to him
(e.g. NAVOSH)
.




Once Resource Sponsors have developed their programs,
Assessment Sponsors will check the programs. Organizations in
the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV) such as
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Manpower and Personnel
(Nl) and Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Logistics (N4)
act as Assessment Sponsors. The assessments cut across
Resource Sponsor lines to ensure that there is standard
programming for common functions. 62
Managing the programming process for the Navy are two
offices in OPNAV under the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations
for Resources, Warfare Requirements, and Assessments (N8) : the
Programming Division and the Assessment Division. The
Programming Division (N80) issues POM Serials to define
programming procedures and to set scheduled completion dates;
develops program and fiscal guidance to reflect planning
decisions; collates changes to budget submissions; and
completes final pricing and balancing adjustments after
program approval. The Assessment Division (N81) conducts War
Games, the Investment Balance Review, and Assessments to check
for program balance and to make trade-offs between programs in
order to meet guidance set forth in the Defense Planning




"N801 Desk Top Guide," op. cit
. , pp. 3-4, 5
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As previously stated, fiscal guidance during the
programming phase is provided in terms of Total Obligation
Authority (TOA) . In order to achieve balanced programs, TOA is
viewed from the following different perspectives:
• Mission Assessment (e.g., Joint Strike)
• Pillars (Force Structure, Modernization, Readiness,
Susta inability)
• Appropriations (e.g., SCN, MPN, O&MN, MILCON)
• Resource Sponsors (e.g., N093)
• Defense Mission Categories (e.g., the medical function is
part of Defense Mission of Major Force Program 8)
• Major Claimants (e.g., BUMED) 64
1. Major Programming Documents
Programming results in the development of three major
documents: the Program Objective Memorandum (POM); the Future
Years Defense Plan (FYDP) ; and the Resource Allocation Display
(RAD)
.
a. Program Objective Memorandum
The Program Objective Memorandum (POM) is the document
in which each military department and defense agency
recommends and describes its total program within the
resources and policy parameters specified by the DPG. It
provides force level objectives approved by SECNAV for six
years of the PPBS cycle and will describe major system new





starts and significant base or force structure changes for a
ten year period beyond the year of the POM. 65
The POM is the SECNAV's annual recommendation to
SECDEF for the detailed application of Department of the Navy
resources. It covers the objectives, planned activities and
cost of each program. The first two years of the POM are used
to develop the budget that is submitted to Congress.
During the programming phase, information on current
and proposed programs is compiled in the POM and thoroughly
reviewed. Part of this review is an assessment of risks and an
evaluation of the military advantages and disadvantages of
each alternative that has been proposed to meet the risk. 66
Commands and field activities update their program
plans to reflect changing international and national
situations, SECDEF guidance, and technological developments.
The Navy programs are often rebalanced or changed. The POM has
fiscal constraints, but sponsors can rebalance programs within
the total available resources to create more balanced programs
because appropriation controls have not yet taken effect.
While the POM contains six years of financial
information, the primary focus is on the first two years which
will become the basis for building the next budget submission.
65
"N801 Desk Top Guide," op. cit . , p. 3-7
66DODINST 7045.7, op. cit., p. 4.
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For example, the first two years of POM 94 (FY 1994-1999) will
be used as the basis for the 94-95 budget.
b. Future Years Defense Plan
The Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP) is a current
summary of all DoD programs over an eight year period. It
relates manpower and financial resources to military programs.
The FYDP describes accomplishments to date (previous and
current years) and future goals in support of national
strategies.
The Program Element (PE) is the basic building block
of the FYDP. Program Elements consist of forces, manpower, and
estimated costs associated with an organization, a function,
or a project. Each PE describes a mission and the responsible
organization. For example, PE 0807796D refers to Base
Operations - Health Care in the Operations and Maintenance
appropriation for the Defense Health Program appropriation. 67
PEs can be aggregated in the following formats:
• Total resources assigned to a specific program
• Weapons systems and support systems within a program
• Specific resources
• Logical groupings for analytic purposes
• Selected functional groupings of resources68
67U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Deputy
Secretary of Defense, Program Budget Decision 742, 14 December
1991.




Currently, there are approximately 3,000 PEs in the
FYDP, including about 1000 Navy PEs (of which about 300 are
for RDT&E activities) . A Program may consist of several PEs
developed to accomplish a defined objective. 69
The FYDP is a compilation of the decisions that have
been approved by SECDEF on the DoD's total program for the
future. It is an integrated and coordinated program document
that displays forces, costs, manpower, procurement and
construction in the approved programs. The costs of programs
are displayed for an eight year period (prior, current, and
next six years) . Major items, such as aircraft, are displayed
for an additional three years.
The FYDP is prepared in two ways: by Major Force
Program for internal DoD program review, and by appropriation
structure for Congressional budget and appropriation review. 70
c. Resource Allocation Display
The Resource Allocation Display (RAD) is a







"N801 Desk Top Guide," op. cit . , p. 3-1.
70DODINST 7045.7, op. cit., p. 5-1.
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• Naval Warfare Task
• Line item (for procurement purposes) or Activity Group
(for O&M)
The RAD is frequently updated and printed during the
programming phase and reflects the most current FYDP data.
RADs are identified by Roman numerals, with odd-numbered RADs
being sorted by resource sponsor and even-numbered RADs by
claimant. For the Navy, RADs IX and X are the POM as it is
submitted to SECDEF. 71
2 . Programming Phases
The programming phase consists of four parts: Program
Assessment, POM Development, POM Delivery, and OSD Program
Review. These processes combine to convert information from
the planning phase into realistic and viable programs.
a. Program Assessments
The Program Assessment phase, shown in Figure 3-2,
appraises warfare and support programs and assesses the
condition and state of the Navy. Program Assessments are
conducted prior to the issuance of the Defense Planning
Guidance (DPG)
.
A new programming cycle begins with the issuance of
the first memorandum of the POM Serial. POM Serials form a set
of instructions to establish Navy procedures for participation
in the planning and programming processes of DoD. They are
1XPPBS Training Course, op. cit














issued by the Director, Programming Division (N80) , under the
direction of the CNO. The memoranda encompass CNO programming
and fiscal guidance as well as procedural guidance. Whenever
changes to the programming process occur, new POM Serials are
issued to the participants to provide updated direction and
guidance. Each memo is consecutively numbered to ensure each
office has the most up-to-date information. 72
The first POM Serial (for POM 94 it was POM 94-1)
details the structure and provides guidance for the POM
development process. It assigns responsibility to appropriate
offices and provides instructions and schedules for the
programming phase. 73
One of the first major steps in the program assessment
phase is the voicing of CINC Maritime Concerns, which provides
an opportunity for the unified commanders (such as CINCLANT)
to address both the threats and the ability of the forces to
meet the threats based on their operational experience and
assessments. Particular emphasis is placed on changes in the
national security threats since the last program review and
other issues for study as requested by the CNO. This stage of
72,,N8 01 Desk Top Guide," op. cit
. , p. 3-3.
73U.S. Department of the Navy, Office of the Chief of
Naval Operations, Procedures for Program Objectives Memorandum
(POM) 94, Serial 801C/0U651531, 23 August 1990.
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the Program Assessment phase allows an off-year preview of
priority concerns. 74
The Program Review and Apportionment Review phases are
used to update the most recently completed POM. While the
Program Assessment phase is being conducted to compile and
review information for the forthcoming POM, the Resource
Sponsors, such as the Surgeon General of the Navy, are offered
an opportunity in the Program Review phase to review the
second year of the President's budget. For example, POM 94
leads ultimately to the President's budget submission for
fiscal years 1994 and 1995. During FY 1994, the Program Review
phase will allow a resource sponsor to look at the proposed
budget for FY 1995. If changes are required, the resource
sponsor will prepare Sponsor Change Proposals (SCPs) to
propose adjustments to the President's budget submission for
FY 1995. 75
Once all the SCPs are completed, the Apportionment
Review is conducted by the Comptroller of the Navy (NAVCOMPT) .
This review covers current and prior year budget execution. As
in the example above, NAVCOMPT would review actual budget
execution to date in FY 1994, and make recommendations for
reallocation of funds for both FY 1994 and 1995 based on the
execution.
74CNA, Building the Navy POM, op. cit., p. 16
15PPBS Training Course, op. cit., p. 77.
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In an effort to move Navy POM development and analysis
closer to the organization and process used in the Joint Staff
Offices, Naval Warfare Appraisals are now Mission Area
Assessments. Mission Area Assessments are comprised of Joint
Mission Area (JMA) and Support Area (SA) Assessments and are
intended to provide an overview of the current Navy structure
and assess joint capabilities and requirements, cutting across
both resource sponsor and warfare lines. The JMAs and SAs will
be the cornerstones of the POM process, replacing the "Warfare
Area" and "Pillar" breakdowns of the Navy data base as
building blocks. The JMA and SA Assessment process is ongoing
and continues throughout the planning and programming cycle.
The six JMAs and two SAs, with the organizations
responsible for their preparation in parentheses, are:
Joint Mission Area Assessments:
• Joint Strike (N88)
• Joint Littoral Warfare (N85/N86)
• Joint Surveillance (N87/N88)
• Joint SEW/ Intelligence (N6)
• Joint Deterrence (N87)
• Strategic Sealift/Protection (N86)
Support Area Assessments:
• Readiness and Support and Infrastructure (N1/N7)
• Manpower, Personnel, and Shore Training (N81) 76
76„N801 Desk Top Guide," op. cit. ( p. 3-3
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Claimant Program inputs provide major claimants the
opportunity to submit issues relevant to day-to-day
operations. These are issues that are beyond the capability of
the claimant to resolve, have implications for many Navy
programs, or are of such magnitude that they will have a
significant effect on the total Navy program. Each claimant
may identify 25 prioritized issues, accompanied by
program/financial effects. They are forwarded to CNO (N80) who
distributes them to the appropriate resource sponsor. Resource
sponsors must address the top five issues identified through
this process.
POM Issue Papers provide another opportunity for input
by claimants and component commanders to their resource
sponsors. In POM Issue Papers, claimants/component commanders
document five or more issues or requests for changes in
programs. Issue Papers provide the resource sponsors with an
early understanding of claimants' concerns and priorities. The
claimant must prioritize the issues and recommend a
reallocation of resources from a lower-priority program, or
identify cost-savings associated with their proposal. 77
War Games are new decision process tools that have
been added to the Program Assessment phase. Policy and
programmatic issues are discussed by personnel from the Office
of the Chief of Naval Personnel (OPNAV) , Marine Corps





Headquarters (HQMC) , and Fleet and Fleet Marine Force (FMF)
representatives. They integrate the JMAs and SAs, checking for
program balance, and make trade-offs between programs as
required. Capabilities are then played in War Games conducted
by N81 (Assessment Division) in terms of scenarios as set
forth in the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG)
.
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Integrated Priority Lists (IPLs) provide operational
commanders-in-chief (CINCs) the opportunity to submit
prioritized issues via the appropriate component command. For
example, CINCLANT would submit an IPL through CINCLANTFLT.
CINCs are not limited in the number of issues they can submit,
nor are they required to identify offsets as the claimants
are. Official feedback must be provided to the CINCs on the
disposition of their IPLs in the building of the POM. 79
Baseline Assessments identify the minimum required
resources to support a specific program or set of programs at
a stated force level. These Assessments support resource
sponsors in the development of programs by providing rational
baseline costs for projected force levels and associated
support needs. They address programs which cut across several
resource sponsors and are issued in the form of a Baseline
Assessment Memorandum (BAM) . BAMs provide a benchmark to
nPPBS Training Course, op. cit .
,
p. 56.
79Secretary of the Navy Instruction 5000. 16E, "Department
of the Navy Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System
(PPBS)," enclosure (2), p. 2, 31 March 1986.
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determine the adequacy of resource allocation in the Sponsor
Change Proposals/Sponsor Program Proposals (SCPs/SPPs)
.
80
The Investment Balance Review (IBR) is conducted by
the Assessment Division of the DCNO for Resources, Warfare
Requirements and Assessments (N81) . The IBR provides a process
to continually review and update key DON issues brought forth
in the JMAs and SAs. It addresses Navy capabilities and the
tradeoffs required with fiscal and other real-life constraints
to combine assessment results into one complete Navy
investment strategy. This assessment/review process takes the
place of the Warfare Appraisals, Summary Warfare Appraisal,
and Readiness and Sustainability Appraisal.
After presentation of the JMA and SA proposals, the
Resources and Requirements Review Board (R3B) conducts
meetings to discuss the Investment Balance Review proposals.
Upon completion of this review, the DCNO for Resources,
Warfare Requirements, and Assessments (N8) publishes program
guidance to the Resource Sponsors directing them to
incorporate IBR decisions into their Sponsor Program Proposals
(SPPs) . Fiscal guidance is also provided to establish
tentative sponsor "toplines", i.e., the allocation of total
Navy resources among sponsors. With this final update, Program
N801 Desk Top Guide," op. cit., p. 3-6
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Assessments come to an end and the Program Development phase
begins. 81
b. POM Development
Two documents must be issued prior to commencing the
POM development phase, shown in Figure 3-3. First, the SECDEF
issues the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) . Then, the
Secretary of the Navy and the Chief of Naval Operations
provide programming guidance for POM development based on JMAs
and SAs, the Investment Balance Review, and CINC/Component
Commander inputs. The Programming Division (N80) takes this
guidance and develops the DON Consolidated Planning and
Programming Guidance (DNCPPG) . The DNCPPG provides SECNAV
guidance on policy and high interest items to resource
sponsors. It also allows the CNO to provide further technical
guidance for POM preparation and serves as the basis for
program development for resource sponsors.
Fiscal guidance in the programming phase begins with
SECDEF distributing shares of the expected budget to the
military departments with Total Obligational Authority (TOA)
controls for each year of the FYDP. The Navy then divides its
share into a blue/green split between the Navy and the Marines


















Sponsor Program Proposals (SPPs) represent the major
initial proposals for the Navy's POM. Using the latest
guidance and information derived in the Program Assessment
phase, resource sponsors adjust and update their programs so
that the SPPs comply with the guidance set forth in the DPG
and DNCPPG. Additionally, the SPPs must address the
disposition of the CINC IPLs and claimant inputs.
When the SPPs are completed, the resource sponsor must
then present them to the Program Development Review Committee
(PDRC) . The PDRC is chaired by CNO (N80) and consists of flag-
rank representatives from each of the DCNOs, ACNOs, and major
staff offices serving CNO, as well as representatives from
SECNAV. This is the first sounding board for the SPPs, and
gives resource sponsors as well as OPNAV the opportunity to
evaluate the programs and make recommendations for changes.
Sponsor Program Proposal Documents (SPPDs) are prepared to
record major changes to the resource sponsor's program.
Following the SPPs, resource sponsors prepare Post-SPP
Assessments. These are written reports that provide an
evaluation of programs as proposed in SPPs. The Post-SPP
Assessments analyze the degree to which the SPP funding meets
guidance and achieves the required program balance.




Assessments are performed in such areas as manpower, personnel
and training, and logistics. 83
The last portion of the Program Development phase is
Internal Review. The Requirements and Resources Review Board
(R3B) , chaired by N8, reviews JMAs, SAs, and SPPs, and makes
adjustments to the SPPs via "ZOWs" (there is no formal
translation for ZOW)
.
The next level of review is the Navy Staff Executive
Steering Committee (ESC) . The ESC is chaired by the CNO and
includes the VCNO and the Vice (three-star) Admirals, and
provides CNO decisions on policy issues.
The decisions reached by the ESC form the basis for
the Tentative POM (called the T-POM) . The Programming Division
(N80) consolidates and balances the SPPs as adjusted by the
ZOWs. The T-POM is then brought before the Department of the
Navy Program Strategy Board (DPSB)
.
The DPSB is comprised of the SECNAV, Under Secretary
of the Navy, CNO, CMC, and the Assistant Secretaries of the
Navy. They review the T-POM in pillar sections (force
structure, modernization, readiness & manpower, and
sustainability) , review the U.S. Marine Corps POM, and review
responses to CINC IPLs. Programs are rebalanced to meet DPG
83CNA, Building the Navy POM, op. cit., p. 21
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and fiscal constraints, and then the final POM is produced and
ready for delivery to OSD. 84
c. POM Delivery
The POM delivery phase, shown in Figure 3-4, is also
referred to as "end game" because at this stage the POM is
complete. Both the POM and the FYDP for all three services are
passed to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) . They
are screened by Program Analysis and Evaluation (PA&E) and the
CINCs for issue development. Issues are developed when either
PA&E or the CINCs do not concur with the service's POM, and
are resolved in OSD Program Review. 85
d. OSD Program Review
The submission of the POM to OSD signals the beginning
of the defense program review by OSD under the purview of the
Defense Planning and Resource Board (DPRB) (see Figure 3-5)
.
The OSD Program Review provides an opportunity for
senior leadership in the DPRB to review the results of program
and policy initiatives. The program review focuses on the
contents of the POM, asking the following questions:
• What capabilities are being provided?
• Are the capabilities consistent with the DPG and other
guidance?
• What future changes in capabilities can be expected?
MPPBS Training Course, op. cit .
, pp. 67-68
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Source: PPBS Training Course, op. cit., p. 71
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Findings from the program review will influence future
DoD programs, the content of the Program Decision Memoranda
(PDMs) , and identify needs for special studies. 86
The review is constructed using questions, issues, and
analyses provided principally by the Assistant SECDEF (PA&E)
.
The POM is reviewed for program differences between estimates
or alternatives proposed by the OSD staff and the service POM
submissions. Differences are developed as issues for review
and evaluation by the DPRB and are brought together in Issue
Books which are formally presented to the DPRB by the PA&E
staff. Issue Books reflect the OSD position (called a mark
against the service's input), the service's position (called
a reclama against OSD's mark), CINC input, and a
recommendation to the DPRB. Issues are grouped into the
following categories:
• Policy and risk assessment
• Nuclear forces
• Conventional forces
• Modernization and investment
• Readiness and other logistics
• Manpower
• Intelligence
• Management initiatives 87
86
"N8 01 Desk Top Guide," op. cit .
, p. 3-3.
87CNA, Building the Navy POM, op. cit., pp. 22-23.
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The DPRB considers each Issue Book and makes a
recommendation to SECDEF. After reviewing the recommendations
,
SECDEF forwards his decisions to each service and defense
agency in the form of Program Decision Memoranda (PDM) . The
PDM records SECDEF decisions on the POM and forms the basis
for the development of the budget request to Congress. 88
D. BUDGETING
The budgeting phase of the PPBS involves translating
approved programs into annual funding requirements. The
military services must justify the funds to be appropriated by
Congress and then subsequently manage those funds.
The budget phase consists of three major segments:
• Budget formulation and review within the military services
• Overall DoD budget review by SECDEF, Director of the
Office of Budget and Management (OMB) , and the President
• Justification, execution, and management of the budget
once approved by Congress89
Once the individual services have prepared their budget
submissions, OSD segregates the service budgets into discrete
segments for purposes of review and decision with OMB. The OSD
(Comptroller) staff reviews and analyzes each program;
differences result in the preparation of Program Budget
Decisions (PBDs) . The PBD highlights problems with program
88
"N801 Desk Top Guide," op. cit., p. 3-7.
89CNA, Building the Navy POM, op. cit., p. 6
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milestones or funding and permits SECDEF to examine DoD
programs prior to meeting with the President and the Director
of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to resolve final
levels of Defense spending. Program Budget Decisions provide
one or more alternative recommendations to meet a defined
objective. For example, PBD 742 was issued on December 14,
1991, to create the Defense Health Program Appropriation.
Major Budget Issues are identified by the service
Secretaries at the conclusion of the PBD review and are
discussed by SECDEF and the service Secretaries at a special
meeting provided for their resolution. Issues are restricted
to those which have significant impact on the Services. 90
After final approval by SECDEF, the service's budgets are
consolidated into a DoD budget submission and later
incorporated into the President's budget.




IV. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE DHP APPROPRIATION
A. RATIONALE
The Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) is
a management tool used by Department of Defense (DoD) leaders
to apply rational decision making techniques to the allocation
of resources to meet national security objectives. At the
heart of the PPBS philosophy is cost-effectiveness: providing
the most defense for a given cost, or a given level of defense
at the least cost.
While DoD medical leaders have continued to strive for
better quality and availability of health care, the decreasing
overall DoD budget has forced all managers to focus on
identifying means to control and cut costs. [As an entitlement
program, defense health benefits must be provided to any
qualified person i.e., active duty personnel, retirees, and
dependents of active duty personnel, retirees, and deceased
service members]. Because a certain level of health care is
mandated by law to these personnel, the role of the PPBS for
the medical mission is to determine how resources will be
allocated to provide these benefits.
The creation of the Defense Health Program (DHP)
appropriation - the history and specifics of which will be
discussed later in this chapter - is a step in the direction
64
of recognizing this requirement. Funding from the three
military services' Operations and Maintenance (O&M)
,
Procurement, and Research, Development, Test and Evaluation
(RDT&E) accounts have been consolidated into one central
account under the management and control of the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs (ASD(HA)) . Funding for
active duty military personnel is included in the consolidated
medical Program Objective Memorandum (POM) but is transferred
to the Military Departments for budget execution. The ASD(HA)
is now responsible for all three phases of the PPBS for the
Military Health Services System of DoD.
The Military Health Services System (MHSS) is an enormous
organization. It is comprised of the three military
departments (Army, Navy, and Air Force) and three field
activities: the Defense Medical Support Activity (DMSA) , the
Office of Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed
Services (OCHAMPUS) , and the Uniformed Services University of
the Health Sciences (USUHS)
.
The primary mission of the MHSS is to provide medical
services and support to the armed forces during military
operations and to service members, their dependents, and other
beneficiaries in peacetime. 91 The role of the three military
departments and OCHAMPUS is to provide the required medical
9IU.S. Department of Defense, Defense Health Program
Amended FY 1992 /FY 1993 Biennial Budget Estimates, p. 1,
January 1992.
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services. The DMSA provides information system, facility
planning, and program support (e.g., planning, programming,
and budgeting for DoD medical facility construction projects)
for the MHSS. The mission of USUHS is to educate and train
medical personnel to meet the combat and peacetime needs of
the armed forces. 92
To accomplish the medical mission, the MHSS employs an
active work force of 200,000 military and civilian personnel
and an additional 200,000 reserve personnel. With activities
throughout the world, it controls and maintains 148 hospitals,
554 medical clinics, more than 300 dental clinics, and
hundreds of medical activities organic to operational combat
units. The three military departments, together with the
Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services
(CHAMPUS)
,
provide medical services to nearly 9 million
beneficiaries. 93 Fixed military medical facilities operating
worldwide maintain over 14,000 operating beds, admitted over
158,000 patients for care, and provided care for over
11,650,000 people on an outpatient basis. 94
92U.S. Department of Defense, Office of Assistant
Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs) , Organization and
Functions, pp. 16, 22, December 1990.
93Lanier, Jack O., Dr. P.H., FACHE, and Colonel Boone,
Charles, USAF, Ph.D., FACHE, "Restructuring Military Health
Care: The Winds of Change Blow Stronger", p. 121, Hospital and
Health Services Administration, v. 38:1, Spring 1993.
94Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for
Information Operations and Reports, Department of Defense
Selected Medical Care Statistics, Quarter ending 31 December
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Maintaining an organization of this size and complexity
reguires a tremendous amount of financial resources. Due to
technology, physician specialization, and other miscellaneous
factors, medical costs in the United States have escalated at
a rate far above inflation. The Department of Defense (DoD)
has not been immune from these rising prices and, as displayed
in Table 4-1, has witnessed a rapid growth in both the cost of
health care and the percentage of DoD funding used to provide
medical services to its constituency.
TABLE 4-l:MEDICAL CARE SPENDING IN THE DEFENSE BUDGET ($B) 95
1984 1990 % Change
Total Budget Authority 258,150 292,999 13
Health Care Spending
CHAMPUS 1,254 3,119 149
Direct 5,934 10,971 85
Total Health Care Spending 7,188 14,090 96
Health Care as % of Budget 2.8 4.8 71
Department of Defense (DoD) health care costs in nominal
dollars grew at an average annual rate of over eight percent
from Fiscal Year 1985 to Fiscal Year 1991. While this was less
than the ten percent annual growth rate experienced in the
civilian economy over the same period, the overall DoD budget
1991. Figures do not include number of personnel receiving
care from field medical units.
95Congressional Budget Office.
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grew at less than one percent in nominal dollars during this
time. 96
The Program Objective Memorandum (POM) for the Defense
Health Program (DHP) appropriation for FY 1994-1999 requested
funding of nearly $15.6 billion for FY 1994, and a modest 3.7
percent average annual growth for the ensuing five fiscal
years. 97 This represents roughly 5.8 percent of the overall
DoD budget for FY 1994. Clearly the trend points toward an
ever increasing portion of the diminishing DoD budget being
consumed by the medical program. In FY 1992, the medical
program accounted for 5.2 percent of the overall DoD budget,
6.2 percent of military personnel, and 5.6 percent of civilian
personnel. By FY 1999 the medical program, growing relative to
the declining overall DoD budget, will represent approximately
6.3 percent of the overall DoD budget, 6.8 percent of military
personnel, and 5.9 percent of civilian personnel. 98
Prior to the creation of the DHP appropriation, the three
military departments and the three field activities all
independently planned, programmed, budgeted, and executed
their respective budgets. While the three military departments
consumed over 90 percent of health care fiscal resources, it
96U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Health Program (DHP)




98Kearns, P., COL, and Norris, J., "Defense Health Program
Budget Detail, Trends, and Issues", 7 April 1993.
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was difficult to calculate exact expenditures because each
service programmed and accounted for resources in a different
manner. For example, the Air Force used Program Elements (PE)
,
the Army used decision packages, and the Navy used Activity
and Sub-Activity Groups (AGs/SAGs) to account for Operations
and Maintenance (O&M) resources. 99
Additionally, some indirect costs of performing the
medical mission "hidden" in programs such as Base Operating
Support were not readily extractable for calculating costs.
The combination of these and other factors made it difficult
to cull relevant data from each of the services in order to
establish the true cost of providing for the overall DoD
medical mission.
Given the acceleration of health care costs and decreasing
total DoD budget, it became imperative that action be taken to
control health care costs. The creation of the Defense Health
Program (DHP) appropriation is a first step towards the goal
of cost containment. Accumulating costs in a single
appropriation will make costs more visible. Once the costs are
made visible and are identified, steps can be taken to make
rational cost-containment decisions.
"interview between Lieutenant Colonel L. Ongstad, USAF,
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs)
,
Washington, D.C., and the author, 11 March 1993.
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B. BACKGROUND
The organizational and management structure of the
Department of Defense (DoD) Military Health Services System
(MHSS) has been an issue for a number of years. In 1949, the
Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army, General Dwight D. Eisenhower,
recommended to the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) that the MHSS
be studied and measures be taken to unify the three military
department's medical services. 100 The issue of reorganization
has subsequently been studied every four to six years and,
although there have been incremental modifications, the
services have rejected major organizational changes in favor
of maintaining autonomous control over their health care
:ems.
101
The traditional Military Health Services System is
comprised of basically four independent health care providing
organizations. Each of the three military departments, headed
by a service surgeon general, has managed and administered
their own organization. The fourth system of providing health
care, CHAMPUS, has been managed by the Assistant Secretary of
Defense (Health Affairs) (ASD (HA) ) . The service surgeon
generals report to their respective service chief (e.g., the
100U.S. Department of Defense, Director of Administration
and Management, .Review of the Department of Defense
Organization for Health Care, p. 5, March 1991.
101Wright, H.J., Colonel, MC, USA, The Economics of the
Department of Defense Health Care System, Individual Study
Project, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks,
Pennsylvania, 2 April 1992.
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Surgeon General of the Navy reports to the Chief of Naval
Operations) who in turn report to their respective service
secretary (the Secretary of the Navy in this example). 102
In the past few years, as medical costs have consumed an
ever increasing portion of available DoD funding, the debate
over the best organizational structure to provide cost-
effective medical care in the Department of Defense has
intensified. Together with the national debate over reform in
civilian health care, both Congress and the press have
questioned the management and use of resources in the MHSS.
The charges have included that there is no single person
accountable for the program, that the system is riddled with
waste, and that it consistently exceeds budget.
In a period when the armed forces are downsizing and
budgets are being reduced, some support functions for the
three military departments are being consolidated into single
DoD entities. Accordingly, proposals both internal and
external to DoD have been made to merge the three services'
medical organizations into a single Defense Health Agency
(DHA) to meet the military mission requirements. 103
Proponents of maintaining the current organizational
structure, however, point to the fact that military health
care costs, while rising, have increased at a lower rate than





experienced in the civilian economy. Additionally, the MHSS'
mission of providing health care for service members and other
beneficiaries is being met. Therefore, major overhaul of the
system and structural reform is not required. 104
C. CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS
For nearly fifty years, consolidation and centralization
of military health care has been studied and debated. At the
heart of the matter has been the role of the Office of the
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs) (OASD (HA) ) in
achieving cost efficiencies. While the effectiveness of the
relationships between the service surgeon generals and ASD(HA)
has been influenced by the personalities of those holding
these offices, the formal authority of ASD(HA) to manage and
implement congressional and Secretary of Defense (SECDEF)
initiatives has been limited. In an effort to expand the
authority, command, and control of ASD(HA) over military
health care, the ASD(HA) • s charter has been revised as
recently as 1989 and twice in 1991. 105
The driving force behind ASD(HA) charter revisions has
been Congress. The Defense Authorization Act for FY 1989
expressed the need for developing a unified management
mIbid. p. 12 3.
105U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Deputy
Secretary of Defense, Strengthening the Medical Functions of
the Department of Defense, 1 October 1991.
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approach for DoD medical programs. A provision in the FY 1990
House Appropriation Committee Report on the Defense
Appropriation Act directed the Department of Defense to
reorganize its medical program under the control of one
individual. This provision was subsequently rejected by the
Senate Appropriations Committee. In the FY 1991 Defense
Appropriations Act, the Conference Appropriations Committee
Report directed DoD to prepare and submit a plan to centralize
medical programs under the Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Health Affairs) . 106
In response to this congressional interest, the ASD(HA)
,
Dr. Enrique Mendez, submitted a Report to Congress on the
Reorganization of Military Health Care in June 1990. In his
report, Dr. Mendez proposed maintaining the current structure
of the Military Health Services System until he was able to
reorganize the ASD(HA) staff to handle consolidation. 107
A Defense Management Review (DMR) of the health care
organization and operation was conducted later in 1990 and, on
3 October 1990, the first iteration of Defense Management
Review Decision (DMRD) 970 was made available for comment.
This Decision proposed the creation of a Defense Health Agency
l06Review of the Department of Defense Organization for
Health Care, op. cit.
107U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Assistant
Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs) , Report to Congress on
the Reorganization of Military Health Care, June 1990.
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(DHA) into which DoD health care functions would be
consolidated. ,08
In response to DMRD 970, ASD(HA) once again argued that
consolidation at this time would undermine his reorganization
initiatives, destroy his fragile relationship with the service
surgeon generals, and "threaten the link between the services'
operational war fighting forces and vital medical support". 109
As a result of internal disagreements among DoD agencies
regarding the value of reorganization of the Military Health
Services System, the DoD Director of Administration and
Management was tasked with conducting a study on the issue.
This study was completed in March 1991 and provided DoD with
three reorganization options.
The first option was to strengthen the role of ASD(HA) . In
this option, ASD(HA) would develop and be responsible for the
execution of a unified DoD medical budget. The ASD(HA) would
also be responsible for the preparation of annual planning
guidance to be used by the three services in developing
budgets and long-term fiscal plans.
The second option was to create a Defense Health Agency
(DHA) which would be headed by a military flag officer or
civilian who would report to ASD(HA)
.
108U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Department of
Defense (Comptroller) , Defense Management Report Decision 970:
Management of Defense Health Care, 9 October 1990.
109Lanier and Boone, op. cit., p. 125.
74
The third option was to establish a U.S. Medical Command
which would be commanded by a flag officer and who would
report to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 110
While the Department of Defense was reviewing these
options, some members of Congress continued to press for
organizational reform. In June 1991, the House Appropriations
Committee Report on the FY 1992 Defense Appropriations Bill
recommended creating a consolidated Coordinated Health Care
Agency under the direction and control of ASD(HA). 111
That same month, Congressmen Ralph Regula (R-OH) and John
P. Murtha (D-PA) submitted a bill requiring DoD to establish
a Coordinated Health Care Agency by January 1992. Although the
bill was not enacted, it kept the issue alive for debate in
Congress. 112
However, congressional support for reorganization of the
Military Health Services System was not unanimous. Some
members felt that the reorganization proposals did not address
the real problems facing the MHSS, and that time and resources
nQReview of the Department of Defense Organization for
Health Care, op. cit
.
H1U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on
Appropriations, Defense Subcommittee, Report of the Committee
on Appropriations, 102d. Congress, 1st sess. , 4 June 1991.
112U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on
Appropriations, Defense Subcommittee, Proposed Defense
Coordinated Health Care Act of 1991, 102d. Congress, 1st
sess. , 31 July 1991.
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would be better used in developing strategies for a more cost-
effective organization. 113
The ASD(HA) was caught in the middle of the organizational
reform debate. In August 1991, he directed the establishment
of a joint working group to consider the matter of
consolidation of military health care. The working group was
charged to:
recommend a credible, efficient mechanism for channelling
health care responsibilities, authority, and resources from
the Office of the Secretary of Defense to the Services in
order to facilitate better management and achieve certain
economies. 114
The working group was comprised of representatives from
the military departments, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, the DOD Comptroller, and the Office of the ASD(HA) and
focused on three general areas of concern.
First, they explored the issue of how to contain military
medical costs. The general perception of both DoD and
congressional leaders was that the current system did not
contain a satisfactory mechanism for cost containment.
Second, they addressed the organizational form and
management structure which would best facilitate cost
containment. At the crux of this debate was the perceived lack




n4U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Assistant
Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs) , Establishment of Joint
Working Group to Consider Consolidation of Health Care
Functions, 2 6 August 1991.
76
of responsibility, accountability, and authority of the
ASD(HA) in the current organization.
The final issue the working group addressed was the
congressional perception that, left on their own, the military
departments would divert funds fenced for medical programs to
other uses. 115
In addressing these concerns, the working group produced
two options for further internal discussion. The first option
was to create a senior-level group (called the "joint health
staff") who would advise ASD(HA) , coordinate service input on
medical issues, and ensure compliance with ASD(HA) direction
and guidance. The second option was to consolidate MHSS
resources into a Defense Health Agency (DHA) which would
report to ASD(HA) , 116
These two options were then further debated by the working
group. While there was some concern that creating a joint
health staff advisory council might undermine ASD(HA) • s
accountability for DoD medical programs, it was generally
agreed that there were many benefits to be realized from
implementing this proposal. For instance, it would strengthen
policy ties and facilitate coordination among ASD(HA) and the
military services.
115U.S. Department of Defense, Report of the Joint Working
Group to Consider Consolidation of Health Care Functions , 4
September 1991.





The second option generated substantially more discussion.
Concerns were raised that creating a DHA would derail
ASD(HA)'s initiatives to improve access to care and cost
containment. Establishing a DHA would require an enormous
effort to formulate plans, coordinate activities, and make
logistical arrangements.
A final concern dealt with the issue of authority and
responsibility. If medical program funding was to be
centralized under ASD(HA) , then the requisite management
authority over those funds should also be transferred.
Otherwise, it would appear that ASD(HA) was the accountable
entity for funding when in fact the military departments would
still maintain the responsibility for executing the medical
programs. 117
After discussing the two alternatives, the working group
proposed to the Secretary of Defense that a senior-level
advisory council be established. The council would serve as a
forum for ASD(HA) to receive advice on program matters and
also provide ASD(HA) with input from the services to plan,
program, and budget for the medical mission. The advisory
council would advise and recommend resource allocation and
reallocation, coordinate service approaches to health programs
and medical readiness, provide input and feedback to ASD(HA)
from the services on policy implementation, and ensure that
7Ibid., pp. 128-129.
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health care policy and program decisions of the ASD(HA) were
implemented. 118
The working group chairman then briefed the ASD(HA) and
the Deputy SECDEF on the group's recommendations.
D. THE DECISION
Acting on these recommendations, on 1 October 1991, the
Deputy Secretary of Defense (DEPSECDEF) signed a memorandum
designed to improve the functions of the Military Health
Services System. The key components of this memorandum, which
were later incorporated into Program Budget Decision (PBD)
742, were:
• Assign ASD(HA) as the sole DoD official responsible for
the effective execution of the Department's medical
mission.
• Place medical personnel, facilities, programs, funding,
and other resources within the DoD under the authority,
direction, and control of ASD(HA)
.
• Direct ASD(HA) to prepare and submit a unified medical
program, providing resources for all medical activities
included in the unified medical budget (including active
military personnel end strength and funding; operational
and maintenance funding to include civilian personnel end
strength; procurement funding; research, development,
test, and evaluation funding; and military construction
funding) . Exempted from this is funding for combat support
and active military personnel which will be accomplished
by the respective Service in its budget request.
• Appoint ASD(HA) to be the sole responsible person to
present, defend, and justify the unified medical program
and budget throughout the Department ' s PPBS
.
[nReport of the Joint Working Group, op. cit.
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• Establish a Defense Medical Advisory Council (DMAC) to
provide advice to ASD(HA) in the execution of the DoD
medical mission.
• Direct ASD(HA) to implement a medical care program that
ensures maximum cost-effective coordination in the
delivery of high-quality health care within certain
geographic areas. 119
The DMAC consists of the ASD(HA) as chairman, one civilian
presidential appointee from each of the military departments,
one general or flag officer from each military service, one
general or flag officer designated by the Chairman of the JCS,
and the president of the Uniformed Services University of the
Health Sciences. Its role is to act as a middle-man between
ASD(HA) and the military departments. The DMAC acts on behalf
of ASD(HA) to ensure that his policies and initiatives are
carried out by the military departments. The DMAC also
provides a channel for the military departments to express
their needs and concerns to ASD(HA) . 120
On December 14, 1991, the Deputy Secretary of Defense
signed PBD 742 to consolidate all medical resources under the
control of ASD(HA) and to make other required adjustments to
the medical program.
This PBD established a separate and unified medical
appropriation which included all medical resources that were
currently contained in the various appropriations of the
U9U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Deputy
Secretary of Defense, Program Budget Decision 742, 14 December
1991.
120Lanier and Boone, op. cit., p. 130.
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military departments. Exempted from the consolidation were
military personnel funds and resources in support of
field/numbered medical units, hospital ships, and ship-board
medical operations. To perform the increased planning,
programming, and budgeting functions resulting from the
consolidation, ASD(HA) was also granted additional funding to
hire personnel to perform the functions. 121
The provisions of PBD 742 consolidated the DoD components'
medical resources currently contained in their Operations and
Maintenance (O&M) , Procurement, and Research, Development,
Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E) appropriations into the Defense
Health Program (DHP) appropriation effective 1 October 1992.
Funding for medical facilities would continue to be reflected
in the Military Construction account but administered by
ASD(HA)
.
On 1 October 1992, the DHP appropriation would commence
funding all direct costs of health care delivery as well as to
reimburse host activities for base operations and other
indirect support provided in accordance with negotiated
reimbursable intra-service support agreements. Additional
support required during the execution of these agreements
would be negotiated between the ASD(HA) and the military
[Ibid.
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departments and adjustments reflected in subsequent
program/budget decisions. 122
The impact of these decisions has been significant. First,
by consolidating medical resources and control over planning
and programming, the ASD(HA) has tremendous power to influence
the direction and course of military health care. Second,
establishing the Defense Medical Advisory Council (DMAC)
provides an ongoing official forum for exchange of information
between ASD(HA) and the leadership of the Armed Services. The
success and effectiveness of the DMAC may determine whether or
not further organizational changes are necessary to achieve
the goals of the MHSS. 123
E. SUMMARY
The establishment of the Defense Health Program (DHP)
appropriation as directed by Program Budget Decision (PBD) 742
has necessitated changes in the Planning, Programming, and
Budgeting System (PPBS) for the three military departments.
Prior to the creation of the DHP appropriation, the three
services independently performed the three phases of the PPBS
to meet medical requirements. With the consolidation of
service health resources under the management and control of




ASD(HA) to justify their programs and compete for scarce
resources.
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V. BUILDING THE POM FOR THE DHP APPROPRIATION
A. BACKGROUND
Program Budget Decision (PBD) 742 of 14 December 1991
directed the Department of Defense (DoD) to establish the
Defense Health Program (DHP) appropriation to commence in
Fiscal Year (FY) 1993. The three military departments (Army,
Navy, and Air Force) were directed to transfer medical
resources contained in their Operations and Maintenance (O&M)
,
Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E) , and
Procurement appropriations for consolidation into the DHP
effective 1 October 1992. 124
Beginning in Fiscal Year (FY) 1993, the Defense Health
Program (DHP) appropriation provided funding for support of
world-wide medical and dental services to active duty forces
and other eligible beneficiaries.
Over forty percent of the DHP funding is used to finance
the costs of the Civilian Health and Medical Program of the
Uniformed Services (CHAMPUS) . CHAMPUS provides for the health
care of eligible active duty dependents, retired members and
their dependents, and the eligible surviving dependents of
deceased active duty and retired members.
124U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Deputy
Secretary of Defense, Program Budget Decision 742, p. 3, 14
December 1991.
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In addition to CHAMPUS and military patient health care,
the DHP also finances veterinary services, costs of medical
command headquarters, specialized services for the training of
medical personnel, and occupational and industrial health.
Finally, this program provides funding for the acquisition of
capital expense equipment and for basic and applied medical
Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E)
.
The FY 1992 DoD Appropriations Act appropriated $8.1
billion of medical Operations and Maintenance (O&M) funds
originally requested by the three services to the consolidated
DHP appropriation under the control of the Assistant Secretary
of Defense for Health Affairs (ASD(HA)). This represented the
majority of medical O&M funds except for $0.6 billion to fund
Navy Medical Base Operations Support and Air Force medical
training which remained under the services' control. 125
The amended FY 1993 President's Budget submission in
February 1992 established the DHP appropriation of $9.5
billion in three budget activities - O&M, Other Procurement,
and RDT&E - including over $3.9 billion in funding for
CHAMPUS, and continued the central funding of medical
construction in the Defense Agency Military Construction
account. 126
125Kearns, P., COL, and Norris, J., Defense Health Program
Budget Detail, Trends, and Issues, 7 April 199 3.
126JJbid.
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In the FY 1993 Defense Appropriation Act dated 5 October
1992, Congress approved the President's budget submission with
the exception of the RDT&E funding. These funds, totaling $313
million, plus a congressional increase of $322 million, were
returned to the three services and Defense Agency accounts
where they had been carried prior to the establishment of the
DHP appropriation. 127
Thus, as of the start of FY 1993, the majority of medical
program funding and activities were under the direction and
control of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health
Affairs (ASD(HA). 128
The Navy alone transferred over $2 billion from its O&M
account contained in Budget Activity 8 (Training, Medical, and
Other General Personnel Activities) to the DHP for FY 1993.
Among the Naval activities affected by this transfer were:
Care in Regional Defense Facilities (Teaching Hospitals)
;
Station Hospitals and Medical Clinics; and Care in Non-Defense
Facilities (including CHAMPUS) J 29
127U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Deputy
Secretary of Defense, Program Budget Decision 041, p. 3, 13
December 1992.
128U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Health Program
Amended FY1992/FY1993 Biennial Budget Estimates, pp. 1-2,
January 1992.
129U.S. Department of the Navy, Justification of Estimates
FY92/93 Budget Estimates, pp. 3-8-103, 115, 121, February
1991.
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In addition to the O&M transfer, Program Budget Decision
(PBD) 742 directed the Navy to shift $37.4 million from its
RDT&E (which was ultimately returned to Navy control by
Congress) and $47.2 million from its Procurement accounts to
the DHP. 130
The ASD(HA) is now responsible for developing and
submitting requirements for the Defense Health Program
appropriation through the PPBS. Through the service
Secretaries, he issues direction and guidance to the three
services in the preparation of their Program Objective
Memorandum (POM) submissions. The services continue to have
the organizational assets and expertise to assist the ASD(HA)
in all phases of PPBS to provide the medical activities
required to meet the military departments' respective missions
and goals. In addition to their assistance in the PPBS
process, the three services continue to be responsible for the
day-to-day management and operations of their respective
activities.
B. ASD(HA) ORGANIZATION TO SUPPORT PPBS FOR THE DHP
The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs
(ASD(HA)) serves as the principal staff assistant and advisor
to the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) for all Department of
130PBD 742, op. cit
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Defense (DoD) health policies, programs, and activities. 131
Prior to establishing the Defense Health Program (DHP)
appropriation, the ASD(HA) did not play a major role in the
planning and programming of medical resources for the three
services. The three military departments had primary
responsibility to plan and program for the medical resources
required to meet their respective missions.
Strengthening the charter of ASD(HA) in the 1990s and
issuing Program Budget Decision (PBD) 742 in December 1991
served two purposes. First, it gave ASD(HA) responsibility and
accountability for the entire Military Health Services System
(MHSS) . For the first time, the PPBS for the three military
departments and the Civilian Health and Medical Program of the
Uniformed Services (CHAMPUS) would be under the direction of
one organization. Second, PBD 742 provided authority and
funding for ASD(HA) to hire 52 new civilian personnel to
administer the PPBS for the DHP appropriation.
With the new hiring authority and funding, the Office of
the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs
(OASD(HA)) is now fully staffed to provide an in-depth review
of independent service POM and budget submissions for
consolidation into one Defense Health Program submission to
the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF)
.
131U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Assistant
Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs) , Organization and
Functions, p. 1, December 1990.
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The Deputy Assistant Secretary (Health Budgets and
Programs) (DASD (HBP) ) is the primary assistant to ASD(HA) for
coordinating and managing all OASD(HA) financial programs,
budgets, and evaluation of programs. The DASD (HBP) develops
OASD(HA) input to the Defense Planning Guidance; reviews the
Program Objective Memorandum (POM); and provides OASD(HA)
input on Program Decision Memoranda (PDMs) , Program Budget
Decisions (PBDs) , and Defense Management Review Decisions
(DMRDs) for incorporation into the PPBS.
Assisting the DASD (HBP) are two Executive Directors: one
for Resources Management and the other for Program Review and
Evaluation. The Executive Director of Resources Management is
responsible for plans and policy development, programs, budget
formulation and execution, and program and financial control.
The Executive Director of Program Review and Evaluation is
responsible for Health Program review and evaluation,
research, and analysis. 132
C. THE EFFECT OF THE DHP ON THE PPBS
1. Fiscal Years 1992 - 1993
The three services had each independently planned and
programmed to produce their respective Program Objective
Memoranda (POMs) for Fiscal Years (FYs) 1992 through 1997 (POM




POM 92 served as the basis for the budgets for FY 1992 and FY
1993. Program Budget Decision 742 was signed 14 December 1991,
roughly one-quarter into the execution phase of FY 1992, and
therefore did not effect the PPBS for that fiscal year.
The effect that PBD 742 had on the PPBS for FY 1993
was also minimal. Program Budget Decision 742 directed the
establishment of the DHP appropriation effective 1 October
1992 (the beginning of FY 1993) . However, by the time the PBD
was signed on 14 December 1991, the Planning and Programming
Phases for FY 199 3 had already been completed; POM 92 had been
completed the previous year. As a result, the only PPBS Phase
of POM 92 that PBD 742 could impact was the Budgeting Phase.
The timing of the issuance of PBD 742 in December 1991
and the requirement for the Department of Defense' budget
submission for FY 1993 as part of the President's budget
submission to Congress in January 1992 left virtually no time
for the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health
Affairs) to play an active role in the PPBS. As a result, the
three services' budget estimates were basically totaled
together under the DHP, and ASD(HA) provided oversight on the
execution of the budget for FY 1993.
2. PPBS for FY 1994 - 1999
The first consolidated Program Objective Memorandum
(POM) prepared for the Defense Health Program (DHP)
appropriation was for Fiscal Years (FY) 1994-1999. Due to the
90
timing of the issuance of Program Budget Decision (PBD) 742,
this was not a complete Planning, Programming, and Budgeting
System (PPBS) cycle.
When PBD 742 was signed on 14 December 1991, the
Planning and Program Appraisal (now Program Assessment) phases
for the Program Objective Memorandum (POM) for Fiscal Years
1994-1999 had been in progress for over a year. The first Navy
POM Serial (94-1) had been issued in August 1990 by the Office
of the Chief of Naval Personnel (OPNAV) and had scheduled the
Program Planning Phase to be conducted from September 1990 to
November 1991, after which time the Program Development Phase
would begin. 133
As a result of this timing problem, the majority of
program planning for the Department of the Navy (DON) had been
completed prior to the establishment of the Defense Health
Program (DHP) appropriation. The Summary Naval Warfare and
Summary Readiness and Sustainability Appraisals (now the Joint
Mission Assessments and Support Assessments) had been
completed, and Navy Component Commanders had submitted point
papers for each Integrated Priority List (IPL) item. 134
In response to the establishment of the DHP
appropriation, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) staff requested
•"Department of the Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval
Operations, Procedures for Program Objectives Memorandum (POM)
94, Serial 801C/0U651531, 23 August 1990.
134JJbid.
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the commanders-in-chief (CINCs) to submit IPLs specifically
for medical-related items (called Medical IPLs or MIPLs)
.
After the MIPLs were received by the JCS, they were segregated
according to service responsibility and then sent to the
respective service for action. Additionally, the entire
package of MIPLs was sent to ASD(HA). 135
To illustrate this MIPL process, CINCLANT might have
submitted a MIPL to the JCS pertaining to a particular medical
issue in the Norfolk, Virginia area. The JCS would determine
that the Navy was the service responsible for addressing
medical issues in this geographic area and forward the MIPL to
the Surgeon General of the Navy and ASD(HA) . The Surgeon
General of the Navy and the Navy's Bureau of Medicine (BUMED)
would then review the MIPL and ensure that the issue was
addressed in the Navy POM input.
Ttfith the completion of the Program Planning phase, the
Navy began the Program Development phase. There were several
documents produced to guide the Navy in the development of
their programs. Overall guidance for the Department of Defense
(DoD) was provided in the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG)
.
Programming guidance from the Secretary of the Navy (SECNAV)
and the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) based on the completed
appraisals and CINC/Component commander inputs resulted in the
135Interview between Commander D. Snyder, MSC, USN, Office
of the Surgeon General of the Navy, Washington, D.C., and the
author, 11 March 1993.
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promulgation of the Department of the Navy Consolidated
Planning and Programming Guidance (DNCPPG) . The Assistant
Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs) also provided Medical
Program Guidance based on the DPG.
The applicable portions of the DNCPPG and ASD(HA)
Medical Program Guidance which concerned the Navy's medical
mission were then forwarded to the Surgeon General of the
Navy. The Surgeon General of the Navy passed on the guidance
to his Major Claimants (e.g., BUMED) for the development of
POM inputs. 136
The three military departments then independently
prepared their own inputs for the Defense Health Program POM.
For the Navy, the guidance provided by the DPG, DNCPPG, and
ASD(HA) Medical Program Guidance was transformed into
resources required to meet the Department of the Navy's
medical mission. The individual services were required to
submit resource requirements to the ASD(HA) in Program Element
(PE) format. Program Elements, as described in Chapter III,
consist of forces, manpower, and estimated costs associated
with an organization, a function, or a project, and describe
a mission as well as the responsible organization. For
example, the mission of providing care in regional defense
facilities is identified by Program Element 0807711. An
136Interview between Commander D. Snyder, MSC, USN, Office
of the Surgeon General of the Navy, Lieutenant Commander G.
Ininns, MSC, USN, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Health Affairs), and the author, 11 March 1993.
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alphabetical suffix at the end of this PE denotes the
responsible organization: A for Army, N for Navy, F for Air
Force, and D for a Defense Agency.
The POM inputs from the three services were submitted
to ASD(HA) in Program Element format. Justifications of and
comments on specific inputs were provided by the services for
ASD(HA) review. Changes from previous years' submissions were
explained, as were any other significant issues.
Upon receipt of the services' POM inputs, program
personnel in the Resources Management Division at ASD(HA)
combined the amounts listed in the POM inputs for each PE.
Comments and issues from the services were likewise combined
as required to justify the input. The resulting combined POM
became the Defense Health Program (DHP) POM for FY 1994-
1999. 137
The DHP POM was then delivered by ASD(HA) to the
Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) . The ASD(HA) raised several
concerns during the issue development portion of the POM
Delivery phase. First, the medical program resources
transferred from the military department in PBD 742 did not
adequately fund outyear requirements, including a $175 million
shortage from the Air Force and a $135 million shortage from
137Interview between Lieutenant Commander G. Ininns, MSC,
USN, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health
Affairs), Washington, D.C., and the author, 11 March 1993.
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the Navy. 138 The ASD(HA) was able to realign resources in POM
94 to cover the program shortfalls through FY 1996. However,
he identified the following projected funding shortfalls for
the outyears: a shortage of $104 million in FY 1997, $602
million in FY 1998, and $1.17 billion in FY 1999.
Though PBD 742 transferred resources from the three
services to the DHP, the ASD(HA) questioned the validity of
the amount transferred. The ASD(HA) had provided feedback to
the DoD Comptroller after PBD 742 was issued, contending that
medical program funding approved in the FY 1992-1997 Program
Decision Memoranda (PDMs) had not been correctly reflected in
the Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP) due to an error. Because
this error had not been corrected in PBD 742, the resources
transferred by the three services to the DHP were understated.
There were several other issues which affected funding
for all of the years in the FY 1994-1999 DHP POM. These issues
included inadequate levels of resources transferred from the
services to the DHP to maintain: Base Operations Support for
Army and Navy medical and research facilities; the
Occupational Health Program for the Navy; the continued
operation of the Moody Air Force Base medical facility; and
construction funds for Army medical training facilities. 139
138Kearns and Norris, op. cit., p. 3.
139U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Health Program
(DHP) Program Objective Memorandum (POM) FY 1994-1999 , 1992.
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The Air Force and Navy have agreed to reprogram
funding to cover $160 million and $135 million respectively of
their shortfalls. Moody Air Force Base, which was targeted for
base closure but later removed from the closure list, was
funded under PBD 041 in December 1992. Finally, the issue of
Base Operations Support is being addressed in PBD 429
concerning the transition to Defense Business Operations Funds
(DBOF) . ,40
After discussion of these and other issues, the
Programming Phase continued with the OSD Program Review cycle.
Changes to the DHP POM submitted by ASD(HA) were made by the
Secretary of Defense via Program Decision Memoranda (PDMs)
,
which generally specified the individual service whose funding
was to be adjusted. This ended the Programming phase for the
DHP for FY 1994-1999 and began the Budgeting phase.
The budgeting phase, which began in the summer of
1992, commenced with reviews by the OSD (Comptroller) and
OSD(PA&E) . A final review of the budget submissions involving
personnel from OSD and from the Office of Management and
Budget (OMB) resulted in the issuance of Program Budget
Decisions (PBDs) to make final adjustments to the budget. The
Budgeting phase culminated with the submission of a two-year
DoD budget request to the President for inclusion in his





overall budget. The President's budget request for FY 1994 and
FY 1995 was then submitted to Congress in January 1993. 141
3. PPBS for FY 1996 - 2001
The most recent cycle of the Planning, Programming,
and Budgeting System (PPBS) began in July 1992, and will
develop a Program Objective Memorandum (POM) for Fiscal Year
(FY) 1996 through FY 2001. Programming and budgeting for this
cycle will culminate with the submission of a two-year budget
for FY 1996 and FY 1997 in January 1995. 142
This will be, from start to finish, the first complete
PPBS cycle to be conducted for the Defense Health Program
(DHP) appropriation. As in the past, the military departments
will conduct the bulk of the Planning and Programming Phases
to meet their medical mission requirements, with guidance from
and inputs provided to the Office of the Assistant Secretary
of Defense for Health Affairs (OASD(HA)).
In anticipating the Program Objective Memorandum (POM)
for Fiscal Years (FY) 1996-2001 (POM 96) , it is assumed that
certain events in the PPBS cycle will occur in a specific
sequence and involve the identified organizations.
'"'interview between CDR Snyder, LCDR Ininns, and the
author, op. cit.
142Department of the Navy, "Program Planning and
Development Division (N801) Desk Top Guide," p. 3-2, rev. 17
February 1993.
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There are two important factors which may have a large
impact on programming for POM 96. First, with the change of
administration in the Executive Branch, funding for the
Department of Defense will probably be reduced below the
levels planned for and used to produce the POM and Future
Years Defense Plan (FYDP) for FY 1994-1999. The last four
years of the FYDP become a starting point in developing the
next POM and FYDP (in this case, the POM for FY 1996-2001)
.
Therefore, an initial step in developing POM 96 will be to
determine the extent of the proposed additional cuts.
The second factor which may impact the schedule for
POM 96 is the prospect of producing a "mini-POM" for FY 1995.
The services have been awaiting direction from the Secretary
of Defense (SECDEF) to complete an abbreviated POM-cycle for
FY 95. Should this happen, the impact on POM 96 is not
known. 143
Neither factor affected the Navy Program Planning
Phase to develop POM 96, which commenced in August 1992 with
the issuance of the first POM Serial to provide structure and
guidance for the PPBS process.
At this point it is important to note that Program
Planning for POM 96 and Program Review for FY 1995 overlap,
and that the events to review the program for FY 1995 are then
""interview between Lieutenant Commander G. Ininns, MSC,
USN, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health
Affairs), Washington, D.C., and the author, 12 May 1993.
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used to shape POM 96. Therefore, the first part of this
section will look at the sequence of events for Program Review
of the FY 1995 budget (including the revised budget submission
for FY 94) , which will in turn guide the preparation of POM
96. Figure 5-1 provides an overview of the PPBS used to
develop the FY 1994/FY 1995 budget submission. Figure 5-2
depicts the basic program development cycle and projected
timelines for both the FY 1995 Program Review and the
development of POM 96.
In September 1992 (and continuing throughout the PPBS
cycle to produce POM 96) , the revised Assessment Process
commenced. As previously mentioned in Chapter III, the
Assessment Process replaced the Appraisal Process and now
consists of conducting six Joint Mission Area (JMA) and two
Support Area (SA) Assessments. 144
The assessment of the Navy medical mission falls
within the Readiness, Support, and Infrastructure portion of
the Support Area Assessment. This Assessment (or Appraisal
under the old system) has been historically conducted by a
Navy Medical Services Corps (MSC) officer assigned to the
Assessment Division (N81) in the Office of the Chief of Naval
Operations (OPNAV) . However, the current MSC officer assigned
to N81 is due to rotate in the summer of 1993 with no relief
144U.S. Department of the Navy, "Program Planning and



















































































Source: Wagoner, R.C., CAPT, USN, "Program Planning and
Development Division (N801) Flowchart," 30 September 1992
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planned. Because the amount of medical funding over which the
Navy now has direct control (e.g., funding for hospital ships)
is relatively small, the full-time assignment of an officer to
assess the program may no longer be cost-effective. 145
In conjunction with the Assessment Process, the
Investment Balance Review (IBR) began in September 1992. Also
conducted by N81, the IBR summarizes and integrates the JMAs
and SAs to ensure that the Navy successfully plans and
programs to meet its missions and roles. The IBR is aptly
named - it serves to ensure that there is a proper balance of
invested resources in the different joint and support mission
areas.
Starting in January 1993, the Resources Requirements
Review Board (R3B) then began reviewing the JMAs, SAs, and
findings from the IBR. In addition, a new organization in the
OPNAV reorganization, N83 (CINC Matters) began collecting
component commander inputs for review by the R3B. The result
of the R3B review was a revised FY94/95 budget. This revision
was then passed to the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (DCNO)
for Resources, Warfare Requirements, and Assessments (N80) for
final balancing and approval in February 1993. Included in
145Interview between Lieutenant Commander R. Foster, MSC,
USN, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Washington,
D.C., and the author, 10 March 199 3.
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this balancing were the N81 conducted War Games and a
synthesis of individual JMA/SA reviews. 146
The FY 94/95 revised budget was then passed to the
Navy Comptroller (NAVCOMPT) and DoD Comptroller for review for
inclusion in President Clinton's budget submission to
Congress. After congressional review, the FY 94 Defense
Authorization and Appropriation bills will be passed. Recent
history suggests that the FY 94 bills will be passed some time
after the start of the fiscal year on 1 October 1993, and that
a continuing resolution will be in effect until the bills are
passed.
While the FY 94/95 budget was being passed to
NAVCOMPT, the Program Review and Coordinating Committee
(PRCC) , chaired by N80 and including Surgeon General
representatives, began determining the planning decisions
which would be used to provide detailed guidance to the
Resource Sponsors in reviewing the FY 95 program. The inputs
of the PRCC were submitted to the Chief of Naval Operations
(CNO) via the R3B.
In March 1993, after CNO review, N80 developed program
and fiscal guidance reflecting the planning decisions
recommended by the PRCC. Among these decisions were that only
"mini-BAMs" (Baseline Assessment Memoranda) should be





conducted and that no IPLs (Integrated Priority Lists) were to
be submitted.
Additionally, the Resource Sponsors were tasked with
developing Sponsor Change Proposals (SCPs) for FY 1995 to
reflect noted program changes and conducting "mini Post-SPP"
(Sponsor Program Proposal) assessments.
In May 1993, the R3B began review of these changes and
delivered its recommendations to N80 for final balancing and
approval. The resulting adjusted FY 95 budget will then be
submitted to NAVCOMPT to begin the apportionment review. 147
The work to date will result in N80 submitting an
updated POM serial in August 1993 to define the process and
set the schedule for POM 96. The R3B will begin reviewing the
JMAs, SAs, the findings of the IBR, and the component
commander inputs collected by N83 in September and October
1993. In November 1993, the Assessment Division (N81) will
conduct War Games and balance the investments across all areas
to ensure that mission requirements will be met. Also in
November, the PRCC will meet to recommend planning decisions
to the CNO through the R3B to guide the building of Sponsor
Program Proposals (SPPs)
.
In December 1993, N80 will develop program and fiscal
guidance to reflect these planning decisions. Baseline
7Ibid.
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Assessments will be conducted and Integrated Priority Lists
prepared.
From December 1993 through February 1994, the Resource
Sponsors will build their Sponsor Program Proposals based on
SECDEF fiscal guidance passed through N80. After the post-SPP
assessments are completed in February 1994, the POM enters the
"end game." The POM will be reviewed by the R3B, the Navy
Staff Executive Steering Committee (ESC) , and the Department
of the Navy Program Strategy Board (DPSB) , chaired by the
Secretary of the Navy. Final pricing and balancing adjustments
to the POM will be made by N80 in March 1994, with POM 96 to
be delivered to NAVCOMPT and OSD in April 1994. 148 The OSD
Program Review (sometimes referred to as the "summer review")
will then begin.
D. SUMMARY
The establishment of the Defense Health Program (DHP)
appropriation has not had a dramatic affect on the mechanics
of the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS)
employed by the three military departments. While the
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs) (ASD (HA) ) is
now more actively involved in the PPBS as the Resource Sponsor
for medical programs, the services continue to perform much of
*Jjbid. p. 3-5.
105
the work to produce a Program Objective Memorandum (POM) and
therefore retain some influence in the shaping of the POM.
Certainly the enhanced role of the ASD(HA) in the PPBS and
the management of the Military Health Services System (MHSS)
will have an impact on the services' POM submissions and the
goals of the MHSS as a whole. The strengthened charter of the
ASD(HA) will provide one central organization to view total
DoD medical program costs and offer initiatives such as
managed competition to reduce those costs.
However, a bigger question in reviewing the effects of
establishing the DHP appropriation is what do we hope to
accomplish with this new appropriation? If the goal of PBD 742
is strictly to reorganize the MHSS, it fails to address the
overarching concern for cost containment.
Recent history tends to reflect an apparent inability of
the PPBS to accurately predict the ultimate expenditures for
the medical program in the Department of Defense.
A review of the Department of the Navy's medical
programming history in Chart 5-3 displays the programming
shortfalls for that service. The programmed funding is
consistently and substantially below the actual (certified)
expenditures for that fiscal year. The differences have been
made up in budget execution, i.e., money has been shifted from
other accounts into medical. As a point of clarification, POM
88 and the DHP allocation have the same symbol. Under the






























Source: U.S. Department of the Navy, Bureau of Medicine, 1992
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that POM 88 projected budget estimates for FY 1988 through FY
1992. The DHP Allocation was effective for FY 1992 and is
projected on the chart through FY 1993, so POM 88 and the DHP
allocation overlap for FY 1992.
As a result of the individual service's problems in
estimating medical program costs, DoD budget estimates for
inclusion in the President's budget submission have been
increasingly understated, as evident from Table 5-4.
Table 5-4: Defense Medical Program Funding History ($M) 149
FY Actual Estimate (FY) Amended (FY) Amended (FY)
1993 8352.1 (92) 9507.5 (93)
1992 7967.9 (92) 9323.5 (93)
1991 9462.0 6693.2 (90) 7104.1 (91) 7555.2 (92)
1990 6971.1 6269.7 (90) 6283.0 (91)
1989 6164.8 5659.5 (88) 5852.3 (89) 6017.6 (90)
1988 5701.6 5336.3 (88) 5681.8 (89)
1987 4853.2 4552.7 (87) 4344.8 (88)
1986 4333.4 4104.9 (86) 4106.1 (87)
1985 3785.4 3910.2 (85) 3881.9 (86)
1984 3588.6 3692.2 (84) 3609.5 (85)
1983 3379.9 3053.8 (83) 3263.3 (84)
1982 2961.9 2779.6 (82) 2747.6 (83)
1981 2527.0 2569.5 (82)
The first column is the Fiscal Year (FY) of the budget
request. The second column is the actual expenditure on
149Congressional Budget Office, Defense Health Program
(DHP) /Medical Program, pp. 23-117.
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Department of Defense (DoD) medical programs. The third column
is the initial estimate for the cost of the program for the
cited fiscal year. Next to the number, in parentheses, is the
Fiscal Year of the request in which this estimate was cited.
For example, the third column for FY 1982 is 2779.6 (82). This
means that the initial estimate of the cost of the DoD medical
program for FY 82 (to commence 1 October 1981) in the FY 82
Budget Request (which would have been submitted in January
1981) was $2,779.6 million. The fourth and fifth columns are
any noted amendments or changes to that initial estimate.
Continuing with the above example, the fourth column for FY 8 2
is 2747.6 (83). This means that the estimate of the cost of
the DoD medical program for FY 82 in the FY 83 Budget Request
(submitted one-quarter of the way through FY 82 in January
1982) was now $2,747.6 million.
Analysis of the data in Table 5-4 shows that the
difference between initial estimates and actual program costs
from FY 1986 to FY 1990 rose from 5.28 percent to 10.06
percent. 150 Over the same time period, the differences between
the amended estimates and the actual program costs rose from
5.25 percent to 9.87 percent. Prior to this period, estimates
were generally close or even exceeded the actual program
costs. However, it may be inferred that the differences
150Fiscal Year 1991 was not included in this analysis due
to the unplanned expenditures as a result of Operation Desert
Shield which skew the differences between estimated and
actual.
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experienced from FY 1986 through FY 1990 have occurred as a
result of decreasing DoD budgets (adjusted for inflation)
beginning in FY 1986 and have widened as the budget continues
to shrink.
Through 1991, all the services had consistently (seven
years running) underestimated the costs of the Civilian Health
and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services (CHAMPUS)
accounts. Much of this shortage was due to the services'
requirement to use general O&M inflation factors vice medical
inflation factors to estimate and price expected CHAMPUS
costs. The shortfalls in CHAMPUS required the Department of
Defense (DoD) to submit supplemental budget requests to
Congress. Because of the political sensitivity of denying
medical care to patients due to DoD budgeting shortfalls,




These facts can lead to several inferences. First, the
PPBS is an inadequate management tool to develop an accurate
budget estimate for an entitlement program. Second, current
statistical and other predictive models used to estimate
health care costs are inaccurate and in need of revision.
Third, in the competition for scarce resources, medical
programs do not compete well against operational programs and
151Johnson, D. E., Colonel, MC, USA, A Consolidated
Military Health Care System, Individual Study Project, U.S.
Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, 1 May 1992.
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therefore are funded with dollars remaining after other
programs are fully funded. Fourth, events beyond the control
of DoD drive costs well above what was budgeted. Fifth,
because enrollment in DoD health care programs is not
mandatory for beneficiaries, it is difficult to accurately
predict year-to-year the number of beneficiaries who will use
the MHSS. Or finally, there are indications that medical
programs may be purposely underestimated to allow funding of
other programs with the intent of seeking supplemental funding
for medical programs when shortfalls occur.
For whatever reason, the apparent inability of DoD to
submit accurate medical budget estimates to Congress played a
large role in the creation of the DHP. It is too early to
determine whether the establishment of the DHP will correct
this problem.
Ill
VI. PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS
A. OVERVIEW
The Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) is
a management tool used by the Department of Defense (DoD) over
the past thirty years to provide a rational decision-making
process in the allocation of resources to competing programs.
It is the process through which the Military Health Services
System (MHSS) estimates patient loads and other operating
requirements, applies cost formulas to those estimates, and
produces a planned expenditure amount for budgeting purposes.
Although differences between the forecasted estimates and
actual expenditures for the MHSS have been steadily increasing
over the past decade, it is difficult to determine if the
differences are a result of inefficiencies in the PPBS itself
or the result of other factors.
Eligible beneficiaries are not required to enroll in a
specific military health care plan. Based on a 1984 survey of
beneficiaries conducted by the Department of Defense, the
Congressional Budget Office estimated that 9 percent of
active duty dependents and 57 percent of retirees and their
families utilized the military health care system. 152
'"Congressional Budget Office, Testimony of Robert D.
Reischauer, Director, p. 2, 10 May 1993.
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Some eligible beneficiaries, particularly retirees, have
other sources to draw on to provide medical care coverage
(e.g. , Medicare) . Others may have insurance obtained privately
or through spousal employment. However, these so-called
"ghost" eligibles can re-enter and utilize the Military Health
Services System at any time. 153
This Chapter will review the problems inherent in
programming for an entitlement program such as DoD health
care. It will also review some of the arguments for and
against a composite military health service such as a Defense
Health Agency in light of the consolidation of defense health
resources into the Defense Health Program (DHP) appropriation.
Finally, it will look at current initiatives and factors which
will have an effect on the PPBS for the MHSS.
B. PROGRAMMING FOR AN ENTITLEMENT
The Defense Health Program (DHP) appropriation is unlike
other appropriations such as Operations and Maintenance (O&M)
in that it supports an entitlement program. People who meet
certain criteria are by law eligible to receive specific
medical services provided by the Department of Defense (DoD)
.
As previously mentioned, there is an underlying uncertainty as
to the number of eligible beneficiaries who will actually
utilize DoD medical services. However, due to the entitlement
153Ibid.
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nature of health care, medical leaders in the DoD are limited
in their ability to affect program costs. Given the
congressionally-mandated population base that must be served,
any cost savings to be achieved may be as a result of reduced
services and/or lower quality of care.
The DHP is an anomaly in that it is an entitlement program
incorporated within the largest single discretionary funding
account in the Federal budget. The DHP currently represents
nearly six percent of the overall Department of Defense budget
and is predicted to continue to consume an ever-increasing
portion of the funding. 154
In this current period of decreasing DoD budgets and
increasing entitlement funding, concerns over funding
priorities for discretionary and entitlement programs are
expected to grow. 155 The difficult issues that DoD leaders
must wrestle with in the allocation of scarce resources
between discretionary and entitlement programs are a microcosm
of the problems the President and Congress face with the
entire federal budget. Certainly entitlement programs must be
funded, but to what level? It may be in the best interest of
DoD leaders to fund an entitlement program such as the medical
154Kearns and Norris, op. cit., p. 1.
155U.S. Congress, Congressional Budget Office, The
Economic and Budget Outlook: Fiscal Year 1994-1998
, pp. 35-37,
1993 and Hager, George, "Entitlements: The Untouchable May
Become the Unavoidable", pp. 22-3 0, Congressional Quarterly,
2 January 1993.
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program, or even a major acquisition program such as the C-17,
at the lowest supportable cost estimate. By budgeting at the
lowest cost estimate rather than what may be a more realistic
higher estimate, more funding can become available for other
programs. Then, should shortfalls arise in the medical or
acquisition programs, historical data suggests that
supplemental budget requests for these programs would likely
be approved by Congress.
With the change of administration in the Executive Branch
in January 1993, DoD was handed even larger budget cuts than
had been planned under the Bush administration. Leaders in the
Department of defense must make rational decisions on how to
allocate the reduced resources in the most cost-efficient
manner in keeping with the administration's national strategic
goals. This is likely to result in intense competition among
programs within the PPBS system. In Strategic Forces, the Air
Force provides bombers and missiles and the Navy provides
submarines, and these programs can be competed against each
other. However, as an entitlement program, defense health
care really only competes against itself. There is no other
entity within DoD to provide this service. Therefore, it is
difficult to determine if there may be a less expensive way to
provide health care services to DoD-benef iciaries.
A new concept being explored by the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Health Affairs to contain costs is a combination
of "Managed Competition" and Capitation-Based Resource
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Allocation. In the past, resources were allocated to Military
Treatment Facilities (MTFs) based on workload measures.
Capitation changes the resource allocation to a fixed amount
per beneficiary being served by the MTF. The MTF commander
will then utilize "Managed Competition" to attempt to make the
most efficient use of these allocated resources by mixing in-
house DoD medical services and private sector services. It is
ASD(HA) • s opinion that this new concept is consistent with
many of the features reportedly contained in the forthcoming
national medical plan. 156
In this time of decreasing budgets, the DHP appropriation
poses significant problems for DoD. First, while the active
duty and dependents patient base is decreasing, the retiree
population is growing due to the effects of the all-volunteer
force and longer life spans. 157 The proportion of retirees,
their dependents, and survivors is estimated to grow from 45.2
percent in FY 1992 to 48.7 percent in FY 1995. This older
population requires more complex and more expensive health
care services. 158 While the retiree population may provide
more opportunities for medical personnel to exercise their
156U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Assistant
Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs) , "Preparing the MHSS for
Managed Competition and Capitation-Based Resource Allocation"
(Draft), p. 1, 3 May 1993.
157CBO Testimony of Robert Reischauer, op. cit .
,
p. 9.
158U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Health Program,
Volume I , Budget Estimate Submission, Operations & Maintenance
and Procurement FY 1994/FY 1995, May 1995.
116
skills in surgery, their proportional increase is certainly a
bad omen for cost reduction.
Second, the overall DoD budget is being decreased in real
dollars and yet the Program Objective Memorandum for FY 1994-
1999 calls for the DHP to grow at an average annual rate of
3.7 percent ($15.6 billion to $18.7 billion) and this is an
optimistically low growth rate. Growth rates in the costs of
civilian and military health care in the years preceding this
POM were approximately ten and eight percent respectively. 159
With continued growth in mandatory spending programs such as
the medical program or environmental clean-up and a decreasing
budget available for all programs, funding for discretionary
programs is squeezed and options for possible discretionary
funding reduced.
To illustrate the difficult decision that must be made,
assume that the national security strategy requires a certain
level of defense (1080 units of defense effectiveness) . The
Department of Defense determines that the resources required
to meet this strategy cost $120, of which $20 is in
entitlements and $100 in discretionary funding. Each dollar of
discretionary funding provides ten units of effectiveness and
each dollar of entitlement spending provides four units.
If Congress appropriates only $90 for the defense budget,
DoD has three choices. First, fully fund entitlements at $20
159U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Health Program




and somehow allocate a $30 budget cut to the discretionary
programs. This, however, leaves defense at 780 units of
effectiveness, implying that some national security objectives
cannot be met.
The second choice is to zero out entitlements to fully
fund discretionary programs. But $90 for discretionary
programs would again fail to meet national security objectives
(900 units of effectiveness versus the goal of 1080) . And, of
course, it is not a realistic option because DoD cannot choose
to not fund its entitlement program.
The third option is to somehow spread the cut to both
entitlement and discretionary programs and try to control
costs and/or increase the effectiveness per dollar spent ratio
to meet both the financial and operational objectives.
Although this is a very simplistic model, it does serve to
illustrate some useful concepts associated with entitlement
and discretionary funding.
First, when money gets tight, you can sometimes defer
discretionary funding. Ships can be tied up to save fuel
costs; maintenance can be delayed for a month or two to save
on repair costs. But entitlements are mandated by law and
cannot be deferred. If a person is entitled to a service and
applies for it, he or she must receive the service.
Second, entitlement programs can be politically sensitive.
Many entitlement programs are provided by the government to
citizens who are perceived to be disadvantaged, e.g.,
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unemployed, elderly, or ill. Recommending cuts in entitlement
programs, however necessary, may be viewed as an attack on the
poor and defenseless and therefore has been generally avoided.
Finally, rising entitlement costs in a period of declining
budgets can seriously impair the primary mission of an
organization and leave limited options for the organization's
leaders. As the mandatory spending portion of the defense
budget continues to grow, both absolutely and in relation to
the discretionary portion, DoD leaders must continue to
articulate to Congress the trade-offs between programs which
must be made to stay within the imposed fiscal limitations, as
well as congressional responsibility for the resulting size
and shape of the armed forces.
C. A COMPOSITE MILITARY HEALTH CARE SYSTEM?
Since the establishment of the unified Department of
Defense in 1947, numerous studies have been conducted to
examine the Military Health Services System (MHSS)
.
The recommendations of these studies have been relatively
consistent. While token acknowledgement of the unique aspects
of each service is made, the studies have had difficulty in
providing rational distinctions among the types of health care
provided by the medical departments of each service. While
there may be different requirements for uniformed personnel
best handled by their specific service, the provision of
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peacetime health care to DoD beneficiaries (e.g., retirees and
dependents) is not service specific.
The majority of these studies have recommended at least
some degree of unification of the MHSS, but these findings
were largely ignored by the military. However, increased
congressional attention to the subject of military health care
finally resulted in the establishment of the Defense Health
Program (DHP) appropriation and more centralized power in the
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health
Affairs (OASD(HA) ) . 16°
The establishment of the DHP may be a precursor to the
consolidation of the three services' medical functions into
one Defense Health Agency (DHA) . In a study completed in
September 1991, "guidance from the ASD(HA) indicated that
creation of a single entity would be the only acceptable
proposal". 161
If in fact the Department of Defense is considering
creating a single DoD agency for health care, then it is
important to recount some of the historical arguments which
have been raised both for and against this consolidation and
160Johnson, D. E., Colonel, USA, A Consolidated Military
Health Care System, Individual Study Project, U.S. Army War
College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, 1 May 1992.
161U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Assistant
Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs) , Report of the Joint
Working Group to Consider Consolidation of Healthcare
Functions, p. 2, 4 September 1991.
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the possible impacts on programming and budgeting for a
consolidated Defense Health Agency.
Opposition to a consolidated Defense Health Agency has
historically centered on three basic arguments. The first
argument contends that removing Service Secretaries and
Service military leaders from management of their respective
medical departments will adversely impact their ability to
integrate medical readiness with other service missions.
The counter to this argument is that Service leaders only
manage their medical missions in theory. In reality, the
services have very little discretion in the management of
their medical assets. Because it is an entitlement program,
the services to be provided and the eligible beneficiaries are
largely determined by law. The services can use what
discretion they have to determine how much health care is
provided in-house and how much is provided through the
Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services
(CHAMPUS) . However, even this can hardly be described as
management discretion. If you reduce the amount of care
available at military health care facilities, eligible
beneficiaries will seek care at civilian facilities and the
CHAMPUS bill will be sent to the service. 162
The second argument focuses on the services losing their
ability to trade-off resources between medical and non-medical
testimony of Robert Reischauer, op. cit., p. 4.
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uses. This argument has now been overtaken by events with the
establishment of the DHP. By strengthening the charter of the
ASD(HA) and creating the DHP, the services may have lost their
ability to underestimate medical resource requirements, use
this extra funding for non-medical uses, and submit a
supplemental budget request to fund the resulting medical
shortfalls. The flexibility to trade off resources between
medical and non-medical uses has now moved to the Office of
the Secretary of Defense (OSD). 163 However, even this
flexibility is limited to the degree in which OSD can acquire
accurate data from the services in the performance of their
programming tasks in order to make rational trade-off
decisions.
The third argument has focused on the doctor-patient
relationship. The crux of this argument is that there is a
special bonding between members of the same service that does
not exist between members of different services. While their
is some subjective validity to this argument, the bond has
weakened over the past decade with the influx of civilian
practitioners at military hospitals. Additionally, the high
proportion of retirees served by the MHSS is provided care
based on a geographic rather than service-specific basis.
Finally, a fourth and relatively new argument against
establishing a Defense Health Agency is that the disruption
,63Johnson, op. cit., pp. 4-7.
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which would be caused by a potentially sizable reorganization
would undermine attempts to institute new programs and occupy
DoD leaders' time and energy which could be better utilized in
exploring cost-saving ideas such as the Coordinated Care
Program (CCP) . But reorganization is inherently disruptive,
and precedents do exist for successful consolidations, e.g.,
the Defense Logistics Agency. As to the argument that programs
such as CCP will have to be put on the back burner, this fails
to recognize that in either status quo or complete
consolidation, the same people will be affected and the same
offices accountable for the completion of both programs. 164
The argument in favor of consolidation generally begins by
noting that some efficiencies in delivering health care can be
achieved and then leads to the resulting cost savings to be
realized by implementing these efficiencies. Critics of the
current system point to examples of redundancy where two or
more of the services provide health care in the same
geographic proximity (e.g., San Antonio, Texas, with the
Army's Brooke Medical Center and the Air Force's Wilford Hall
Medical Center) . The argument is not that the facilities are
underutilized but that certainly some economies of scale could
be realized by combining the two.
Proponents of consolidation also contend that the current
system does not integrate the peacetime and wartime medical
mIbid. pp. 4-10.
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missions, and that a consolidated Defense Health Agency-type
organization would allow for better review and management of
required personnel resources. For example, it would not matter
if one service had a shortage of certain qualified personnel
as long as the other services had an off-setting surplus. This
argument discounts the fact that certain personnel may not be
interchangeable during the time of conflicts. Additionally,
certain numbers of medical personnel might be transferred from
active duty to reserve status; they are needed for a wartime
mission but not to support peacetime activities. 165
The arguments for consolidating the three services'
medical departments into a single entity eventually focus on
the cost savings to be realized through consolidation. In the
above examples for instance, the redundancy claim does not
focus on the fact that military health care facilities are
underutilized, but that there is some degree of wasted tax-
payer money by having separate administrative organizations.
The second argument contends that there are certain qualified
personnel not required by the military full-time which will
again lead to cost savings.
As previously mentioned, critics of consolidation
subscribe to the "if it ain't broke, don't fix it" theory.
They point out that military health care cost growth rates
have been lower than those experienced in the civilian sector,
sIbid. pp. 10-12.
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which argues in favor of actually increasing the amount of in-
house care offered by the MHSS. However, these lower growth
rates may be a result of capped salaries of health care
professionals and unmortgaged physical plants rather than any
operating efficiencies. 166
Recent studies have estimated that the Department of
Defense could save $225 million per year by consolidating its
medical functions. 167 While this is a considerable amount of
money to the average tax-payer, it represents less than 1.5
percent of the total DoD health care budget and is on par with
general accounting discrepancies. In other words, depending on
the type of accounting system used, this savings could be
realized on paper without reorganization. Second, these noted
cost savings from consolidation presume the reduction of
levels of bureaucracy which may or may not occur and, should
they occur, may reappear at a later date.
The arguments raised both for and against a consolidated
MHSS do not appear to address a more fundamental problem.
Basic economic theory states that as price for a normal good
(such as health care) decreases, the quantity demanded will
increase. At some price, the quantity demanded will begin to




Many beneficiaries in the military health care system pay
little or nothing out-of-pocket for their health care and
therefore have little reason to economize on the amount of
health care they use. Adjusting for differences in use
associated with sex and age, active duty dependents under the
age of 65 living in the United States consumed about 72 days
of hospital care per 1,000 people either through the direct
care or CHAMPUS systems. This rate is roughly one-third higher
than the civilian rate of 535 days per 1,000 people. 168
A recent Congressional Budget Office study shows that even
if the active duty force is drawn down to 1.2 million in 1997
(14 percent below the current estimate) , health care costs
directly related to patient care would rise from $9.5 billion
in 1993 to $11.2 billion in 1998. 169 This escalation in health
care costs occurs for several reasons.
First, the medical inflation rate has been almost twice as
high as the rise in consumer prices. From 1982 to 1991, the
medical component of the Consumer Price Index (CPI) has risen
by 7.9 percent a year as compared to the overall CPI growth of
4.1 percent. 170 Second, active duty members and their
dependents currently represent roughly one-half of the




population eligible for DoD health care benefits. 171 A 25
percent reduction in these beneficiaries represents only 12-13
percent of the population. The cost savings to be realized
through this reduction in population are quickly eclipsed by
medical inflation rates, and the drawdown of active duty
personnel and their dependents further skews the proportion of
elderly and generally less healthy individuals served by the
MHSS.
The ultimate answer, for both the federal government and
DoD, may be to enact measures to either limit access to or
discourage frequent usage of federal health care systems. This
may entail raising the eligibility criteria to a higher level,
charging higher premiums per visit, or raising deductibles.
How these options will be affected by the outcome of the
Presidential Task Force on Health Care Reform is not known.
D. SUMMARY
As the overall budget for the Department of Defense (DoD)
continues to decrease, several initiatives are being proposed
to contain the rapidly escalating medical program costs. How
these initiatives will affect the current structure of the
Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) employed by
DoD is not known. However, it is likely that the methodology
171Congressional Budget Office, Defense Health Program
(DHP) /Medical Program, p. 117.
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used to plan and program for the Defense Health Program (DHP)
appropriation will change.
Program Budget Decision (PBD) 041 of 13 December 1992
questions the proper pricing of the medical program. In PBD
041, the acting DoD Comptroller contends that, as a result of
numbers computed by both the Defense Manpower Data Center and
the DoD Comptroller, the Department of Defense is making
decisions to provide and possibly expand medical services
using cost estimates which understate the actual costs
incurred. As a result of these understated costs, past
planning and programming decisions on where and how to best
provide care have been flawed.
For example, under the new pricing factor directed by the
DoD Comptroller, the estimated cost per outpatient visit
increased from $77 in FY 1992 to $100 in FY 1993. While some
of this cost increase may be attributed to medical inflation,
the majority is a result of new personnel pricing factors.
Similarly, inpatient third party liability rates were
increased from $707 in FY 1992 to $860 in FY 1993. m
The recent concept of Managed Competition and Capitation-
Based Resource Allocation put forward by the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs will also affect the
mechanics of the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System
,72U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Deputy
Secretary of Defense, Program Budget Decision 041, p. 6, 13
December 1992.
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(PPBS) . Under the current system, the services program and
budget for health programs based on historical resource usage
and workload. These reforms may be an incentive for the
services to produce higher outputs and offer more services
than may be medically necessary.
Under Managed Competition and Capitation-Based Resource
Allocation, Medical Treatment Facility (MTF) commanders will
receive a fixed per capita allowance based on the number of
eligible beneficiaries to be served by their MTF. The MTF
commander is then responsible for the most efficient use of
these resources in filling the medical needs of his
beneficiaries. This will entail a blend of services to be
performed within DoD and civilian medical facilities. The
incentive for the MTF commander is to stay within a prescribed
budget and not to provide more costly care than is clinically
appropriate. 173
If the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS)
is to remain the primary management tool employed by the
Department of Defense in resource allocation, then developing
a new system or organization to address the problems of the
medical program must follow the PPBS logic. A threat (in this
case an objective) must be defined. Strategies to achieve this
objective must then be developed. The requirements and
resources needed to achieve the different strategies must be





identified and priced, packaged into a program, and become
part of the budget.
Medical programs pose measurement problems similar to
those in other programs. How clear and measurable is the
objective? How much health care is enough? Can you ever have
too much? What non-quantitative costs can be or have been
ignored? If medical treatment facilities are closed and/or
consolidated, how does this affect access to care and
therefore the morale of active duty personnel? Are the driving
assumptions of providing quality health care at least cost
mutually exclusive? Can DoD contain or even reduce costs and
still provide the same level of health care? Finally, how will
the President's Task Force on Health Care Reform affect the
current organization and the PPBS for the Military Health
Services System?
Health care is certainly a difficult, complex, and
expensive service which requires constant review. This paper
has examined how the Department of Defense has determined
requirements and resource allocation for the medical program
in the past, and detailed some initiatives for the future. The
organization and primary management tool to be used to support
that organization in the performance of providing medical care
in the future are the focus of current debate and may not be
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